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Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past.
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx.
PART ONE: AGRICULTURE
INTRODUCTION
Assessing the nature and direction of economic development in India is an 
important theoretical and practical task with profound political and social 
implications. After all, any serious attempt at a radical restructuring of Indian 
society, if it is not to fall prey to empty utopianism, will need to base its long-term 
strategy on the historical trends in the evolution of the material conditions of life of 
the vast majority of the population.  Attempting to build on past debates and as part 
of on-going attempts at radical transformation of Indian society, this paper tries to 
provide a summary account of the evolution of some key structural features of the 
Indian economy over the last few decades. 
In providing this summary account, we connect with and speak to issues thrown up 
by earlier work on characterizing Indian society. The primary, though implicit, 
reference point for this paper is the “mode of production” debate that occupied 
scholars and activists in India during the 1970s and 1980s.1 This paper is an 
attempt to revisit that debate in the light of new data that has since become 
available; it is also an attempt to widen the analytical and empirical focus beyond 
the agricultural sector, the sole concern of the “mode of production” debate. While 
it is true that agriculture continues to “employ” the vast majority of the working 
people in India, the last few decades have also witnessed the slow and erratic 
growth of an industrial and services sector. A large part of the working class now 
constantly shuttles between these sectors, as much as they physically move 
between regions and states. Hence it is important to include this growing non-
agricultural sector in any analysis of the evolution of the Indian economy.
The principal questions that motivate this study are: what types of production 
relations does the vast majority of the working population in Indian agriculture and 
industry labor in? How is economic surplus appropriated from the direct producers? 
The aim is to understand the material conditions under which the working 
population labors and the manner in which it is exploited.
The analysis is largely pitched at the aggregate level, complemented, wherever 
possible, with micro-level studies and data. While a study of the structural evolution 
1 Thorner (1982a, 1982b, 1982c) summed up the debate and Patnaik (1990) contains a selection of the key articles.
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of the Indian economy is of interest in itself, this paper uses trends in the structural 
evolution of the Indian economy to make inferences about the mode of generation, 
appropriation and use of the surplus product in Indian society.2 The focus on surplus 
appropriation, in turn, is motivated by the Marxist idea that the form of extraction of 
unpaid surplus labour provides the key to understanding the structure and evolution 
of any class-divided society. This important insight was most clearly articulated by 
Marx in Volume III of Capital:
“The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of 
the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, 
as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a 
determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic 
community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its 
specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners 
of the conditions of production to the immediate producers - a relationship 
whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of 
development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social 
productive power - in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of 
the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship 
of sovereignty and dependence, in short the specific form of the state in each 
case.” (page 927, Marx, 1993; emphasis added.)  
The emphasis on the form in which surplus labour is extracted from the direct 
producers is important and worth dwelling on a little. Every class divided society 
rests on the appropriation of unpaid surplus labour of the direct producers; the fact 
that one group of people can, due to their location in the process of production and 
their relationship to the means of production, appropriate the surplus labour of 
another group is what defines a class. The appropriation of the surplus labour of 
direct producers by the ruling class is as much true of a feudal organization of 
production as it is of a capitalist mode of production. What distinguishes the two is 
the form in which this surplus labour is appropriated by the ruling classes, not the 
fact of surplus extraction per se. It is only in the capitalist mode of production that 
the surplus labour of the direct producers, i.e., the workers, takes the form of 
surplus value and is mediated through the institution of wage-labour. While this 
makes the exploitation of workers less apparent under capitalism, it also 
distinguishes the capitalist mode of production from non-capitalist modes, where 
the appropriation of surplus labour is much more visible, direct and brutal. For 
instance, in the feudal organization of society in Medieval Europe, the surplus labour 
of the serf was immediately visible as the work he did on the lord’s land; the surplus 
labour took the form of the product of the serf’s labour. The visibility of exploitation, 
understood as the appropriation of unpaid labour time of the direct producers, is 
lost under capitalist relations of production; it is obscured by the institution of wage-
labour.
2 For an incisive analysis of the use of the notion of surplus for economic analysis see Baran (1957). 
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This study attempts to identify the evolution of the modes of appropriation of 
surplus labour in India indirectly by studying the evolution of key structures of the 
Indian economy at the aggregate level.  The underlying assumption of the whole 
study is that the evolution of the aggregate economic structures, like ownership 
patterns in the agrarian economy, the evolution of labour forms like tenancy, wage-
labour, bonded labour, the size-distribution of firms in the informal sector, the 
patterns of employment and migration, the importance of merchant and finance 
capital, etc., can provide useful and reliable information about the mode of surplus 
extraction. While it is possible to form a picture of the aggregate evolution of the 
Indian economy using data available from sources like the National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO), the Agricultural Census, the Census of India – and that is 
precisely what we do in this study - we are fully aware of the limitations of such 
aggregate accounts. Many micro-level variations are lost in the aggregate story and 
so, wherever possible, the aggregate picture is complemented with case studies. 
The study is broadly divided into two sections, one dealing with the agrarian 
economy and the other with what has come to be called the “informal” industrial 
sector. This twin focus is motivated by several considerations. First, the agrarian 
economy accounts for the largest section of the country’s workforce and population; 
this makes it a natural focus of any study which attempts to understand the 
evolution of the Indian economy and society at the aggregate level. Second, while 
the non-agrarian economy consists of the industrial and the services sector, the 
majority of the workforce in these two sectors is, again, found in what has been 
called the “informal” sector; that is why this becomes one of the foci of this study. 
Third, to the extent that an understanding of the relations of production (and forms 
of surplus extraction) is at issue, the “formal” industrial and services sector are 
probably beyond the domain of any debate; most serious scholars and activists 
would agree that the “formal” sector is characterized by capitalist relations of 
production. Since, what seems to be at issue is the “correct” characterization of the 
relations of production and forms of surplus extraction in the agrarian economy and 
the non-agricultural “informal” sector, this study focuses on precisely these two as 
an intervention in the broader debate about the characterization of Indian society.
PART I: AGRICULTURE
Framed in the backdrop of massive mobilization of the rural poor against intolerable 
conditions of existence in the late 1960s, expressed politically in the eruption of the 
Naxalite movement and its brutal suppression by the Indian state, the “mode of 
production” debate brought together some of the most prominent Marxist social 
scientists in India in their attempt to characterize the agrarian structure in India. 
Was it capitalist or was it semi-feudal? What were the main classes in rural society? 
How should India’s relationship with imperialism be factored into the 
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characterization of Indian society? What kind of revolutionary political strategy 
followed from the political economic analysis? These were some of the main 
questions around which the debate was organized. 
The time is probably ripe for revisiting this debate, for going back and taking 
another look at the issues raised and the questions asked. There are at least two 
reasons for this. First and foremost, we are probably once again witnessing the 
mobilization of the rural poor against the continued poverty and misery that has 
become their lot under the post-colonial Indian state. The numerous peoples’ 
movements, ranging from anti-SEZ (Special Economic Zone) struggles and 
movements against displacement and for rights over common property resources to 
the Maoist movement, are political expressions of this enormous rural churning. 
This provides a backdrop which is very similar to that provided by the late 1960s in 
India; this backdrop, this objective reality of peoples’ struggles, impels us to once 
again ask fundamental questions about the structure and dynamics of Indian 
society. Second, more than two decades have elapsed since the “mode of 
production” debate ended in the early 1980s; these two and a half decades have 
seen several changes in the direction of policy of the Indian state, the most notable 
being the wholesale adoption of the neoliberal economic framework. Did this policy 
change impinge on the structure of the Indian economy? If so how? With the 
passage of time, we also have access to more and possibly better quality data 
about the Indian economy; this new data can be fruitfully used to empirically 
evaluate many of the claims thrown up during the “mode of production” debate. It 
is for all these reasons, and with motivations very similar to those of the 
participants in the previous debate, that we wish to revisit the mode of production 
debate, starting with an analysis of the agricultural sector and then moving on to 
the “informal” industrial/services sector.
A. SECTORAL COMPOSITION AND AVERAGE SIZE OF HOLDINGS
Probably nothing gives a better introduction to the grim story of Indian agriculture 
than a simple picture of the sectoral composition of the three sectors of the Indian 
economy, in terms of share of total value added and share of total employment. 
While the share of value added coming from agriculture has declined sharply from 
around 56% in 1950 to about 17% in 2007, the share of the total labour force 
engaged in agricultural activities has displayed a much slower decline, as shown in 
Table 1.  This has effectively trapped the largest section of the Indian workforce, for 
lack of alternative employment opportunities, in an extremely low productivity 
sphere of production, leading to extremely low incomes and consumption 
expenditures. The continued reliance of a large majority of the population on 
agriculture, which adds an ever declining share of the value added to GDP, clearly 
underlines the failure of any meaningful structural transformation of the Indian 
economy over the last five decades since political independence. 
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Table 1: Sectoral Composition of GDP and Labour Force
Agriculture Industry Services
share 
of 
GDP
share 
of 
labour 
force
share 
of 
GDP
share 
of 
labour 
force
share 
of 
GDP
share 
of 
labour 
force
2007 16.60 60.00 28.40 12.00 55.00 28.00
2000 24.60 59.30 26.60 18.20 48.80 22.40
1980 38.90 68.10 24.50 13.90 36.60 18.60
                        Source: Various Economic Surveys of India.
With the majority of the working population in India engaged in agricultural 
activities, and with land being one of the most important “inputs” in agricultural 
production, one is naturally led to enquire into the evolution of average size of 
landholdings and other aspects related to ownership of land in rural India. One of 
the key facts about the evolution of the agrarian structure in India over the last five 
decades is the steadily declining size of agricultural holdings as depicted in Chart 1 
(see Table A1 for details). 3 
The average size of ownership holdings has declined monotonically over the last 
few decades, with a value that is currently even less than half the corresponding 
value in the early 1960s. Not surprisingly, the same pattern of monotonic decline is 
observed in terms of both ownership and operational holdings, where operational 
holdings can have more or less land than ownership holdings because of leasing in 
3 Tables with numbers starting with “A” have been collected together in the Appendix.
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and leasing out of land. The declining size of agricultural holdings point towards 
processes leading to fragmentation of land, important among them being continued 
demographic pressures on a fixed quantity of land and lack of employment 
opportunities in the industrial sector. The average size of holdings obtaining in India 
today also has important implications for the agenda of redistributive land reforms, 
as traditionally envisaged within the left political tradition; we will comment on this 
in a later section.
B. PATTERNS OF LAND OWNERSHIP
Understanding the class forces currently working in agriculture requires us to look 
not only at the evolution of the average size of holdings but also at the aggregate 
ownership patterns of land in the rural economy. The steady decline in average size 
of holdings has been accompanied by some striking changes in the pattern of 
ownership of land in rural India.  To better appreciate the changing structure of 
ownership patterns of land in rural India, let us define the following commonly used 
ownership size-classes: all families owning less than 1 hectare of land will be called 
“marginal” farmers; all families owning between 1 and 2 hectares will be called 
“small” farmers; all families owning between 2 and 4 hectares will be called “semi-
medium” farmers; all families owning between 4 and 10 hectares will be called 
“medium” farmers; and all families owning more than 10 hectares will be called 
“large” farmers. This information is summarized for easy reference in Table 2.
Table 2: Size-class Definition
Size-Class Area Owned
marginal < 1 hectares
small 1 – 2 hectares
semi-medium 2 – 4 hectares
medium 4 – 10 hectares
large > 10 hectares
With this definition of the various size-classes, we can see that the proportion of 
marginal farmer households has increased steadily over the last four decades, 
increasing from about 66 percent in 1961 to about 80 percent of all rural 
households in 2003. This rather large increase in the share of marginal farmer 
households has been matched by a steady decline of large, medium and semi-
medium farmer households: large and medium farmer households together 
comprise a minuscule 3.6 percent of rural households in rural India today; in 1961, 
this category represented about 12 percent of all rural households. Between the 
decline in the share of large landholding families and the increase in the share of 
marginal farmer families, the “small” farmer family has managed to more or less 
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maintain its share constant over the past five decades, increasing marginally from 9 
percent to 11 percent of all rural households between 1961 and 2003.  
The pattern of ownership in terms of the share of total area owned more or less 
matches the pattern observed with respect to the share of households in the rural 
areas, though the pace of change is more rapid in this case.  The share of total area 
owned by marginal and small farmer families has steadily increased from 8 percent 
of total area in 1961 to about 23 percent of total area owned in 2003. Paralleling 
this is the steady decline in the share of total area owned by large and medium 
farmer households: the share of area owned by “large” households declined from 
28 percent in 1961 to about 12 percent in 2003; the corresponding share owned by 
“medium” households declined from 31 percent in 1961 to about 23 percent in 
2003. Caught between these two trends is the semi-medium farmer family which 
has kept its share in the total area owned more or less constant since 1971 at 
around 20 percent. The changing pattern of ownership of land is depicted 
graphically in Chart 2 and Chart 3 (see Table A2 for details).
Has this changing pattern of land ownership made the distribution of this most 
important asset more equitable? The answer is a resounding no. Though the share 
of area owned by large landholding families has declined substantially over the past 
few decades, driven most probably by demographic pressures and by some half-
hearted attempts at land reforms, the resulting distribution of land at the beginning 
of the twenty first century in India cannot be seen as more equitable than it was five 
decades ago. In fact, the skewed nature of the distribution of land remains more or 
less intact, as can be seen from the following three measures: the Gini’s coefficient 
of ownership distribution, the Lorenz curve for the ownership distribution and the 
average area owned by size-classes. The Gini coefficient of ownership concentration 
was 0.73 in 1961-62, 0.71 thereafter till 1992 and then changed to 0.74 in 2003 
(Government of India, 2006; pp. 12); the Lorenz curve for the ownership distribution 
has also more or less remained unchanged between 1961-62 and 2003 
(Government of India, 2006; pp. 13). 
Inequality of land ownership can also be understood by studying the evolution of 
the average size of holding by ownership size-classes. Studying this measure 
answers the following two questions: (a) how has the average landholding of 
different size-classes evolved over time, and (b) what is the average size of 
landholding of the marginal peasant household as compared to, for instance, the 
medium or large peasant household? As can be seen from Table 3, the average size 
of holding for the marginal farmers has remained remarkably stable over the last 
five decades at a value of around 0.2 hectares; the average size for all the other 
size-classes has declined, with the largest proportional fall recorded by small 
farmers and the smallest by the category of semi-medium farmers. 
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Table 3: Area Owned per Household by Ownership Size-Class
Year Marginal small semi-medium medium large
1961 0.20 2.41 2.84 6.13 17.64
1971 0.24 1.45 2.81 6.00 16.53
1982 0.23 1.44 2.80 5.92 16.29
1992 0.24 1.40 2.68 5.80 15.87
2003 0.21 1.38 2.67 5.62 14.05
Source: calculated from Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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When we approach the inequality of land ownership by looking at the sizes of 
average holdings across size-classes relative to the average size of the marginal 
farmer household’s ownership area, we find confirmation of the story of continued 
inequality. The relative size of average holdings across the ownership size classes, 
in comparison to marginal holdings, has declined but remains substantially large 
even today. For instance, as summarized in Table 4, the average large holding was 
about 67 times the size of the average marginal holding in 2003; the average 
medium holding was about 27 times the size of the average marginal holding. While 
the former has declined from about 86 in 1961, the latter has declined much less, 
from about 30 in 1961 to 27 in 2003. Thus, the degree of aggregate inequality in 
ownership has remained largely intact through these five decades.
Table 4: Multiple of Average Marginal Holding by Ownership Size-Class
Year Marginal small semi-medium medium Large
1961 1 11.77 13.90 29.97 86.27
1971 1 6.08 11.78 25.18 69.33
1982 1 6.12 11.93 25.22 69.40
1992 1 5.88 11.25 24.38 66.73
2003 1 6.52 12.65 26.57 66.48
Source: calculated from Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
The skewed distribution of land ownership of course in itself does not provide very 
useful information about the dominant relations of production prevailing in the 
agrarian economy and modes of surplus extraction most in use; a predominantly 
feudal mode of production can have a skewed ownership distribution as much as a 
predominantly capitalist mode of production. Many participants in the “mode of 
production” debate in India in the 1970s, and especially Patnaik (1972a, 1972b, 
1976, 1980, 1986), drew attention to the fact that the acreage or size of agricultural 
holdings per se cannot be used to infer the class status, in the Marxist sense, of the 
owner of the holding or the relations she/he enters into with other classes in rural 
society. The same size of holdings can go with very different ways of organizing 
production, i.e., capitalist or semi-feudal, depending on the availability of water, 
power, fertilizers, draught animals, other tools and implements, etc. Hence, the 
same size-class of ownership or operational holding might have members from very 
different classes.
While this argument is theoretically valid, we might nonetheless use the average 
size-class of ownership holdings as a proxy, decidedly approximate, for the class 
position of the owner of the holding. This is a purely empirical argument and follows 
from the following two observed facts: (a) there is a very strong positive correlation 
between the size of land possessed and the ownership of animals, minor tools and 
implements (like sickles, chaff-cutters, axes, spades and choppers) and tractors 
(Statement 2, Government of India, 2005); and (b) if we define, following Patnaik 
(1976), the rural classes as full-time labourer, poor peasant, middle peasant, rich 
peasant, capitalist and landlord, then the proportion of the “upper classes” tend to 
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increase as we move from smaller to larger sizes of ownership holdings. The second 
assertion, which seems fairly intuitive, is partly reflected in Patnaik (1980). In her 
sample of 236 households, of those owning between 2.5 and 10 acres, the majority 
were small peasants; of those owning between 10 and 15 acres, the majority were 
middle peasants. Even though Patnaik (1980) did not use a random sample and the 
sample size was small, we can probably still make the claim that size of holding 
provides a good approximation of the class position of the owner.   
But we do not want to attach more importance to acreage than to use it as a rough 
indicator of class status. Hence, we supplement the above data on aggregate 
ownership patterns with the following variables: (1) geographical variation of land 
ownership across Indian states, (2) the extent of tenancy, both over time and across 
space, (3) evolution of the pattern of tenancy relations, (4) the extent and growth of 
landlessness, (5) the major sources of income of rural households, (6) the pattern of 
capital accumulation in the agricultural sector, and (7) sources of credit in the rural 
economy.  Taken together with the evolution of the pattern of land ownership, these 
might help us construct a broad picture about the relations of production and the 
predominant modes of surplus extraction in the agrarian economy.
Before we look at evidence on these important features of the rural economy, we 
would like to address two possible criticisms: (1) neglect of any discussion of the 
post-independence Zamindari Abolition Acts, and (2) not recognizing the 
importance of irrigation and differential productivities of land. 
The discerning reader might find it surprising that we do not discuss the Zamindari 
Abolition Acts while discussing the transformation of the agricultural sector in India; 
can this be considered a serious lapse of our analysis? We think not.  Zamindari 
Abolition Acts and their impacts have been discussed threadbare by several 
scholars like Daniel Thorner, Wolf Ladejinsky, F Tomason-Januzzi, Francine Frankel, 
and others. Most serious scholars have pointed out that the Zamindari Abolition 
Acts, passed in several provincial legislatures between 1949 and 1954, fell far short 
of transforming the agrarian structure. These acts did not manage to seriously 
appropriate the land of the zamindars and therefore did not manage to curb the 
power of the landed elite as a class in rural society. Despite the passage of several 
variants of these “abolition acts”, zamindari interests managed to cleverly use legal 
loopholes to their advantage, challenging key components of the Acts and thereby 
managed to severely limit the effectiveness of the already timid legal provisions. 
The case of Bihar is only too well known to bear repetition. Frankel (2005) summed 
up the consensus view quite well: the State managed to abolish the zamindari 
system without expropriating the zamindars. Zamindari Abolition Acts did not 
transform the rural class structure in any significant manner; hence, we did not feel 
necessary to devote space to a discussion of these legal provisions and changes.
The second possible objection that we would like to address consists of two related 
points: (a) that we ignore the issue of productivity differentials, especially the 
11
differential productivity of land that exists between irrigated and non-irrigated 
areas; and (b) that this productivity differential makes state-level or national-level 
analysis largely useless.
It is true that the size (of the agricultural unit) and surplus produced (leaving aside 
for the moment the production relations under which surplus is being produced) 
have a complex relationship co-determined by technological and geographical 
variables. A small plot in a dry area will produce much less surplus than a small plot 
in a well-irrigated area; a small fruit orchard will produce more by way of income 
than a small subsistence plot. But to the best of our knowledge data on access to 
water is not available at the national level to the same extent that data on land 
ownership distribution is; hence, even though we understand the importance of the 
issue of access to water, we do not present detailed data on this in the paper. We 
hope that this issue will be explored in future research.
We do not think that productivity differentials between irrigated and non-irrigated 
areas make state-level analysis useless. The appropriate level of analysis depends 
on the questions that the analysis is meant to address. Our aim in this study is to 
understand the broad patterns of evolution of the relations of production that the 
majority of the working population in India labours in; that is why we have 
undertaken the analysis at the aggregate, national and state level. We are aware of 
the fact that this necessarily forces us to ignore several important variations, like 
the extent of irrigation, observable at lower levels of aggregation; every aggregate 
level study would face this limitation. A more disaggregated analysis is something 
we might take up in the future to complement our present study; but we believe 
that this does not detract from the usefulness of aggregate-level studies which can 
inform national-level political strategy and action.
    
C. INTER-STATE VARIATION IN LANDHOLDING PATTERNS
To make sense of the geographical variation in the patterns of land ownership 
across Indian states, we have divided all the states into two groups. The first group 
comprises of states which have a relatively large share of the total area owned by 
large landholding families; we call these the “large landholding states” and 
summarize information about these states in Table A3. The second group consists of 
states where large landholding families own a relatively small proportion of the total 
area; we call these the “small landholding states” and provide data about these 
states in Table A4. As expected, the following states belong to the first group: 
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Punjab, and Rajasthan. The second group, i.e., the small landholding group has the 
following members: Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, 
Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. 
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Why is this division into what we call large landholding and small landholding states 
useful? Anecdotal and other evidence that we present later on in the paper 
suggests that the first group of states, i.e., the large landholding states, is precisely 
the group that has witnessed relatively robust growth of capitalist relations of 
production in agriculture;4 the second group largely consists of the states which are 
still encumbered by remnants of pre-capitalist modes of organizing production. The 
fact that the latter group of states has also seen a decline in the share of land 
owned by large landholding families seems to suggest that the economic position of 
the “semi-feudal” landlords, to the extent they derive their power solely from land 
ownership, has declined relative to the middle and rich farmers and capitalist 
landlords at the national, state and regional level. The semi-feudal landlords seem 
to have been replaced by rich and middle peasants as the ruling bloc in the agrarian 
structure of contemporary India. This, as we point out later, was not so much the 
result of political conflict between a rising capitalist farming class and the feudal 
oligarchy; rather, the latter have, aided by a pliant State, gradually transformed 
themselves into capitalist farmers, among other things. We return to this important 
point later in the concluding section.  
D. LANDLESSNESS
Since land is one of the most important “means of production” in the agrarian 
economy, any analysis of the pattern of land ownership in the rural economy must 
pay close attention to the group of landless households. Since this group of 
households is totally divorced from ownership of land, they might be expected to 
give us an accurate measure of what we might call a rural proletariat class, the 
class of rural population who are effectively propertyless. 
According to National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data summarized in 
Table A5, the extent of landlessness has stayed more or less constant over the last 
five decades: in 1960-61, 11.7% of rural households were landless; the 
corresponding figure in the 2002-03 survey came out to 10%. The inter-state 
variation in landlessness shows that Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka 
have the largest share of landless households in rural areas. On the lower side, 
Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have 
small shares of landless households in the rural economy. 
4 The fact that states like Punjab and Haryana have undergone robust capitalist growth has 
been widely noted and commented on. Evidence that points in this direction are: relative 
consolidation of agricultural holdings, increased mechanization of the production process, 
predominance of peasant-proprietors as opposed to parasitic landlords, radical change in 
the pattern of tenancy (on which more below), accumulation of capital in the agricultural 
sector, etc. For evidence on the growth of capitalist relations in Punjab agriculture see, 
Sidhu, (2005) and the references therein.  
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The NSSO definition of landless households is, we feel, misleading and gives a 
tremendous underestimate of landlessness in rural India. This is because the NSSO 
defines landless households as only those households which own less than 0.02 
hectares. Though the NSSO has consistently used this definition to define landless 
households, this gives an incorrect picture of “effective landlessness”. This becomes 
clear once we juxtapose land ownership data with data on patterns of land use. 
Data put out by the NSSO for 2002-03 show that households owning less than 0.4 
hectares use more than 90% of their land as homestead (Government of India, 
2006a, pp. 25). Thus, if landlessness is understood as pertaining to land that can be 
used for cultivation and that can generate some income for the family, then all 
households owning less than 0.4 hectares should be considered landless. Hence, a 
more realistic definition of landlessness must consider all households owning less 
than 0.4 hectares as “effectively landless”.  
Using this definition of landlessness, we see that the extent of effective 
landlessness is both more pronounced and that it has significantly increased over 
the decades, as shown in Table A5 and depicted in Chart 6. The proportion of 
effectively landless households, according to this definition, increased from 44.21% 
in 1960-61 to 60.15% in 2002-03 for the country as a whole, an appreciable 
increase by all accounts. Since land is the primary input to agricultural production, 
this also underscores the highly skewed distribution of landholding patterns in India 
even today: 60 percent of the poorest rural households own only 6 percent of the 
land used for cultivation! The fact that the majority of rural households are 
effectively landless is also corroborated by looking at the estimate of households 
that own no land apart from homestead (Table 4R, Government of India, 2006a) as 
summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Proportion of Rural Households with no land other than 
Homestead
Andhra Pradesh 53.1 Jharkhand 24.7 Orissa 38.5
Arunachal Pradesh 23.5 Karnataka 40.4 Punjab 56.8
Assam 40.3 Kerala 68.3 Rajasthan 19.6
Bihar 43.7
Madhya 
Pradesh 34.0 Sikkim 44.4
Chhattisgarh 26.2 Maharashtra 44.8 Tamil Nadu 64.5
Gujarat 44.0 Manipur 30.3 Tripura 59.5
Haryana 49.5 Meghalaya 29.0
Uttar 
Pradesh 26.3
Himachal 22.7 Mizoram 14.1 Uttaranchal 27.7
Jammu and Kashmir 11.0 Nagaland 15.5
West Ben-
gal 46.5
            Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
Along expected lines, increasing landlessness is reflected in the increasing 
proportion of agricultural workers vis-à-vis cultivators in rural India. Apart from a 
few outlier states like Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, and 
Rajasthan, most other Indian states in 2001 had substantial numbers of agricultural 
workers compared to cultivators (details in Table A6). Some major states like 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal had more 
agricultural workers than cultivators. The evolution of the relative strength of 
cultivators and agricultural workers in recent decades is also interesting. For the 
country as a whole, while the number of cultivators remained more or less constant 
at 125 million between 1991 and 2001, the number of agricultural workers 
increased from about 86 million to 106 million during this same time period (Mishra, 
2007); increasing landlessness created the grounds for the swelling of the ranks of 
the rural proletariat. 
 
E. TENANCY
Growing landlessness might not lead to the consolidation of capitalist relations of 
production and growth of the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat if there is 
widespread prevalence of tenant cultivation. There are after all, two different ways 
in which the surplus labour of direct producers can be appropriated by the ruling 
classes in a rural context, directly as wage-labour and indirectly as land rent, with 
the latter referring to the rent paid as part of a tenancy contract. The first method 
of appropriating surplus is associated with capitalist relations of production, while 
the second is associated with semi-feudal methods of surplus extraction.
Tenant cultivation, with sharecropping as the form of the tenancy contract, 
especially allows extraction of the surplus product in the form of land rent. 
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Therefore, sharecropping tenant cultivation has been historically identified as one of 
the most important semi-feudal forms of surplus extraction in rural India. It is for 
this reason that the extent of its prevalence today can be used as an important 
indicator of the continued strength of feudal and semi-feudal modes of surplus 
extraction, and indirectly at the relative strength of the landed gentry in rural 
society. Hence, it is important to complement the study of land ownership and 
landlessness patterns with a close study of the evolution of tenancy, both the 
extent of its prevalence and the evolution of its form, over time. What does the 
evidence on tenancy show?
Aggregate level data suggests that tenant cultivation as a form of organizing 
agricultural production has witnessed a steady and steep decline in rural India over 
the last four decades. According to NSSO data, the percentage of households 
leasing in land has declined from 25% in 1971-72 to 12% in 2003; the percentage of 
area leased in to total area owned has declined from 12% in 1971-72 to 7% in 2003; 
and the percentage of area leased out to total area owned has also decreased from 
6% in 1971-72 to 3% in 2003 (Government of India, 2006a). The same declining 
pattern is observed even with data on tenancy from the various Agricultural 
Censuses in India. 
The sharp decline in the extent of tenancy is also observed for operational holdings. 
Whereas the percentage of operational holdings with partly or wholly owned land 
has practically remained unchanged at around 95%, the percentage of operational 
holdings with partly or wholly leased-in land has fallen drastically from around 24% 
in 1960-61 to 10% in 2002-03. In terms of the total area operated, the percentage 
share of area leased in has declined from 10.7% in 1960-61 to 6.5% in 2002-03. At 
the aggregate level, the gradual shift from tenant cultivation to self-cultivation 
seems to be a persistent and unmistakable trend in the Indian agrarian economy.
It is true that aggregate figures about the decline of the extent of tenancy might not 
be very helpful in drawing conclusions about the “tenancy problem”. For it is 
conceivable that the decline in tenancy is largely restricted to larger holdings, i.e., 
those belonging to middle and rich peasants, while there is a simultaneous increase 
in the incidence of tenancy for smaller holdings, i.e., those belonging to poor 
peasants and landless labourers (Patnaik, 1976). Since, in any meaningful sense, 
the “tenancy problem” refers to the indirect extraction of surplus labour of the 
landless and near-landless households, we need to supplement the aggregate 
picture about the evolution of tenancy with a more disaggregated story, where the 
disaggregation runs along size-classes. 
What is the evidence on the evolution of tenancy by size-classes?  As shown in 
Chart 4 (details in Table A7) , other than for large operational holdings, i.e., 
operational holdings of 10 hectares or more, the share of tenant holdings have 
declined sharply in all the other categories. In fact, the share of tenant cultivation 
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has marginally increased for large operational holdings over the last five decades 
(though there is a decline over the last decade even for this category).
       
As shown in Table 6, the share of area leased in by size-class of operational 
holdings display the same pattern across the size-class categories; the share of area 
leased in has declined across the board, with the decline sharpest for the medium 
holdings. For large operational holdings, the share of leased in land declined by the 
least proportional amount. If, as mentioned earlier, the tenancy problem largely 
refers to semi-feudal modes of exploitation of the landless and near-landless 
through tenant cultivation, then this problem seems to have become less severe 
over the last five decades. What about the geographical variation in the extent of 
tenancy?  
Table 6: Share of Area Leased In by Operational Size-
Class
Percentage of area leased in
1960-
61
1970-
71
1981-
82
1991-
92
2002-
03
Marginal 16.6 18.9 9.7 8.7 8.6
Small 14 14.6 8.5 8.5 6.8
Semi-medium 11.7 11.7 7.3 7.4 6.3
Medium 9.6 8.7 6.6 6.9 4.2
Large 8.3 5.9 5.3 11.4 6.1
All sizes 10.7 10.6 7.2 8.3 6.5
              Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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The inter-State variation in the extent of tenancy in 2003 shows an interesting 
pattern too, as summarized in Table A8. The states which report the highest share 
of leased-in area are Punjab and Haryana, the two states which have the most 
“developed” agricultural production. Apart from Orissa, Punjab and Haryana, all the 
other major states had leased-in area which was less than 10% of the total operated 
area. Thus, states which are usually considered to be the bastions of semi-feudal 
and pre-capitalist production relations are not the ones which have the highest 
prevalence of tenancy, with the exception of Orissa; it seems, therefore, that the 
development of capitalism in Indian agriculture has peculiarly used tenancy and 
other forms of pre-capitalist relations of production as means of reducing the costs 
of production and controlling labour.  
To get a complete picture of the extent and effect of tenancy, we need to include 
data on the terms of tenancy too, i.e., how the tenancy contract was specified. The 
NSSO landholding surveys classify contracts relating to leased-in land into the 
following categories: (a) fixed money lease, (b) fixed produce lease, (c) share of 
produce lease, (d) service contract lease, (e) share of produce along with other 
terms, (f) leased from relatives. The NSSO data shows that the predominant form of 
tenancy has been sharecropping, i.e., the share of produce lease. This has not 
changed much over time: the share of leased-in area going for sharecropping has 
stayed relatively stable around 40%, as can be seen from Chart 5 (see Table A9 for 
details). 
The inter-state variation in the terms of lease, (see in Table A10), also provides 
useful information. Haryana and Punjab, the states with the largest share of leased-
in land, had fixed money lease contracts as the predominant form of tenancy. 
Assam, Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh were the four major states which had 
sharecropping as the predominant form of tenancy contract. This difference is 
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important because the form of tenancy is radically different in the two groups of 
states.
In states like Punjab and Haryana, tenant cultivators are no longer the landless and 
poor peasants; it is rather the middle and rich peasants who lease-in land to 
increase the size of their agricultural operations and reap some economies of scale 
on their capital investments (Sidhu, 2005). Thus, the fixed money rent form of 
tenancy is not an indicator of pre-capitalist relations of production, but are rather 
very much part of the capitalist development in Indian agriculture; the land rent 
that is earned by the lessor, in this case, can be considered capitalist rent. In states 
like Bihar and Orissa, on the other hand, tenancy is still predominantly of the old 
form, where the largest group of lesse is landless and near-landless peasants. In 
such a scenario, sharecropping operates as a semi-feudal mode of surplus 
extraction, where land rent can be considered pre-capitalist rent. 5 
The aggregate evidence on tenancy, thus, seems to suggest a sharply declining role 
of tenancy at the national level. What is interesting is that its continued prevalence 
is observed mainly in contexts of capitalist agricultural production, where 
sharecropping is less important than money rents, and not in the states with semi-
feudal modes of surplus extraction; among the three states with the largest 
reported share of tenant cultivation, the top two are Punjab and Haryana, precisely 
the states where capitalist farming has developed the most. In the more pre-
capitalist settings, tenancy is relatively less prevalent today and has steadily 
declined over the decades but, along expected lines, sharecropping continues to be 
the predominant form of the tenancy contract.
A caveat is in order. It is well known that reliable data on the real extent and terms 
of tenancy is difficult to come by. Due to the possibility of legal action securing the 
rights of tenants, there is always an incentive for landlords to understate the extent 
of tenancy they actually participate in. Often times, this is done by replacing 
recorded tenants with unrecorded tenants; if the extent of unrecorded tenant 
relationships are large, then official data on the extent of tenancy would 
underestimate their true prevalence. It is difficult to rule out the possibility that the 
NSSO data on tenancy suffers from such problems. What might mitigate the 
problem is the fact that we have looked at data on tenancy over several decades 
and not only at a point in time; hence, if the prevalence of unrecorded tenancies 
have remained more or less stable over time, we might get a relatively correct 
picture of the trend.   
5 For a distinction between capitalist and pre-capitalist rent see Patnaik (1976).
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F. RETURNS FROM CULTIVATION AND SOURCES OF INCOME
While information on patterns of land ownership, landlessness and tenancy provide 
very useful clues about the agrarian structure of India, this needs to be 
complemented with data on the sources of rural income to get a more complete 
picture of class relations. How does the vast majority earn their incomes? Do they 
work mainly for wages or do they derive the lion’s share of their income from self or 
tenant cultivation? Do they derive a substantial portion of their income from petty 
production? These are important questions to consider because they provide clues 
about the necessary relations into which the majority of the rural population enter 
during the process of production and income generation. A predominance of wage 
income would suggest the gradual spread of the institution of wage-labour and 
therefore of capitalist relations; continued dependence on income from cultivation 
(self or tenant) would suggest an opposite story. 
Several caveats are in order before we proceed. First, a straightforward link 
between wage-labor and capitalism on the one hand, and non-wage income and 
non-capitalism on the other hand has its pitfalls. As we see in the section on 
industry, various types of self-employment income can result from merchant and 
finance capitalist relations (mainly variations on the putting-out system); hence 
non-wage income can often mask the underlying capitalist relations. Similarly, wage 
income can often mask the fact of bondage, extra-economic coercion and other 
forms of “unfree” labour restricting the domain of operation of capitalist relations; 
but, as has been pointed out, for instance by Patnaik (1976), many of these 
“unfree” relations are created by capitalism and are not relics of a pre-capitalist 
past and so cannot be taken as a marker of semi-feudalism. Second, often the same 
individual participates in several types of economic activities, as we mention below, 
and thus the aggregate level distinctions that we make between wage and non-
wage income might need serious modifications when looking at more micro-level 
phenomena. Thus, with these caveats in mind, we will proceed to study the sources 
of rural income because we feel the aggregate level distinction between wage and 
non-wage income still has important clues to offer about the dominant relations of 
production in India.  
To start an analysis of the sources of rural income we need to revisit the issue, 
pointed out earlier, of the continued fragmentation of land. Continuing 
fragmentation leads to a declining average size of ownership and operational 
holdings, and this increasingly brings the question of viability of small-holding 
cultivation to the fore. Of course the small size of the average holding is not the 
only factor that needs to be reckoned with when looking at the issue of viability of 
small-scale cultivation. Existence of the ground-rent barrier (Patnaik, 1986), lack of 
formal credit, movement in the terms of trade vis-à-vis industry and services, 
dwindling rural public investment and rapidly eroding irrigation facilities kick in too, 
and makes technological change almost impossible to initiate and sustain at the 
farm level; the exploitation faced by farmers in the input and output markets, 
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combined with these other factors, force incomes from small holdings to be 
extremely low. For instance, in 2002-03, the average return from cultivation per 
hectare, i.e., value of output less value of paid out expenses (excluding value of 
family labour or rent of owned land), was Rs. 6756 for Kharif and Rs. 9290 for the 
Rabi season (Mishra, 2007). The low return from cultivation, as summarized in Table 
7, implies that most rural families need to augment their incomes through wage 
labour (in both the rural farm and non-farm sectors) and petty commodity 
production (of both agricultural and non-agricultural commodities). The dependence 
on wage income and income from petty production would seem to be especially 
pronounced for the small farmers, marginal farmers and near landless households, 
which together comprise about 85% of the rural population. Along expected lines, 
this is exactly what we find when we look at the sources of income of rural 
households from NSSO data.
Tables 8 and 9 summarize information about the sources of rural income by the 
size-class of ownership holdings. Several interesting facts emerge from this data. 
First, most of the rural households have abysmally low incomes; the incomes do not 
cover even the basic expenditures necessary for survival. It is only the rural families 
with more than 4 hectares of land whose total income exceeds their expenditures 
(Government of India, 2005; Mishra, 2007). To put this in perspective, let us recall 
that in 2003, 96% of rural households owned less than 4 hectares; thus, in 2003, 
96% of rural households had lower total incomes – which includes income from 
cultivation, wage labour, and petty production – than even what their extremely low 
expenditures required. It is, therefore, not surprising that rural India should have 
seen an explosion of debt over the last decade, leading in many cases to severe 
distress and even suicides. Second, for a large majority of rural households, the 
primary source of income is wage income, as can be seen from Chart 7. For all 
families with less than 0.4 hectares, i.e., the effectively landless households as 
defined above, wage income provided more than half of their total monthly income; 
in 2003, let us recall that 60% of rural households belonged to this category. For 
completely landless households, of course, this proportion would be much higher. 
Third, income from petty commodity production accounts for a substantial portion – 
close to 20 percent – of the total income of rural households; this is especially true 
for near landless and marginal farmer households, who together comprised about 
80% of rural households in 2003. 
Thus aggregate level data seems to suggest that wage income has become a very 
important source of income for the majority of the rural population. This implies that 
surplus extraction through the institution of wage-labour has become one of the 
most important forms of extracting the surplus product of direct producers. Since 
income from petty commodity production is an important source of income for the 
landless labourers and marginal farmers, this suggests that exploitation by 
merchant capital through unequal exchange is also an important form of surplus 
extraction. 
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Table 7: Returns from Cultivation, 2003
% of 
house-
holds
returns 
from 
kharif (Rs 
per year)
returns 
from 
rabi (Rs 
per 
year)
returns 
from 
farm ani-
mals (Rs 
per 
month)
returns 
from 
non-farm 
business 
(Rs per 
month)
Aver-
age 
Family 
Size
Near land-
less 9.9 367 462 125 339 5
Marginal 55.6 3243 2667 88 223 5.2
Small 18.1 8098 5922 100 181 5.7
Semi-
Medium 10.6 13880 10596 69 188 6.2
Medium 4.8 22841 20940 75 422 6.9
Large 0.9 33494 34600 122 507 7.5
All  6200 5059 85 236 5.5
Source: Mishra, 2007.
To preempt any misunderstanding, the notion of unequal exchange and its 
relationship to surplus extraction needs some elaboration. As long as commodities 
exchange in proportion to their values, i.e., as long as prices reflect the underlying 
labour values congealed in commodities, artisanal producers cannot be exploited, in 
the Marxist sense of the term, because they are not separated from the means of 
production. But the formation of market prices is mediated through monopoly and 
other forms of bargaining power; hence, market prices for individual and groups of 
commodities can, in the presence of monopoly, deviate from the their labour 
values. If one party to the exchange can systematically ensure this deviation, this is 
tantamount to systematic unequal exchange, i.e., exchange which systematically 
deviates from the labour values congealed in commodities. In such a situation, one 
party to the exchange appropriates part of the value that is produced by the other 
party, and thereby appropriates a part of the surplus labour time of the other party 
without giving anything in return. The markets where the commodities arising from 
petty production by landless and marginal farmers are sold are typically controlled 
by merchants; these merchants manage to systematically ensure deviation of 
prices (they pay to the artisan-producers) from underlying labour values due to their 
monopoly position in these markets. This is the sense in which merchant capital 
manages to appropriate a part of the value produced by petty producers through 
unequal exchange.
G. CREDIT
Informal credit, often linked with product and labour markets, has historically 
played a very important role in the perpetuation of semi-servile conditions of life 
and economic stagnation in rural India. Since usurious capital, which operates 
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through the mechanism of informal credit, is never directly involved in the process 
of production in the sense in which industrial capital is, the profits of the 
moneylender can only be understood as a claim on the surplus product produced 
elsewhere. Usurious capital, therefore, gets a share of the total surplus production 
through the process of redistribution of the surplus without having participated in its 
generation. That is the sense in which usurious capital is understood to be 
necessarily parasitic. 
Table 8: Sources of Average Monthly Income (Rs)
wage 
in-
come
income 
from 
cultiva-
tion
in-
come 
from 
ani-
mals
income 
from 
nonfarm 
business
total 
in-
come
total 
ex-
penses
< 
0.01 1075 11 64 230 1380 2297
0.01-
0.4 973 296 94 270 1633 2390
0.41-1 720 784 112 193 1809 2672
1.01-2 635 1578 102 178 2493 3148
2.01-4 637 2685 57 210 3589 3685
4.01-
10 486 4676 12 507 5681 4626
>10.0
0 557 8321 113 676 9667 6418
          Source: Table 6, Report No. 497, NSS 59th Round.
Table 9: Percentage of Average Monthly 
Income (%)
wage 
in-
come
income 
from cul-
tivation
in-
come 
from 
ani-
mals
income 
from 
non-
farm 
busi-
ness
< 0.01 77.90 0.80 4.64 16.67
0.01-
0.4 59.58 18.13 5.76 16.53
0.41-1 39.80 43.34 6.19 10.67
1.01-2 25.47 63.30 4.09 7.14
2.01-4 17.75 74.81 1.59 5.85
4.01-
10 8.55 82.31 0.21 8.92
>10.0
0 5.76 86.08 1.17 6.99
                         Source: Table 6, Report No. 497, NSS 59th Round.
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During the “mode of production” debate, usurious capital and debt bondage played 
a key role in defining “semi-feudalism”, which was understood as a semi-servile 
state of existence for the working population in the agrarian economy. Low 
production by tenant cultivators necessitated consumption loans; often these loans 
were made by the same landlord who had hired out land to the tenant. The terms of 
these loans were so onerous that they could never be possibly paid back by the 
tenant; as interest kept piling up on top of the original loan amount, the tenants 
were eventually forced to “pay back” in labour services rendered to the landlord. 
Thus, this mechanism of perpetual debt bondage drastically reduced the freedom of 
labour to participate in the institution of wage-labour and created the semi-servile 
conditions identified as “semi-feudalism” (Prasad, 1974). Note that in such a 
situation, a large part of the surplus product of the direct producers was 
appropriated as feudal “labour services”.
Equally important, informal credit was often the mechanism through which different 
markets, like the labour market and the product markets, were linked together. This 
interlinked system of markets then facilitates extraction of surplus through unequal 
exchange, in the sense we have used this term above. Interest rates in these 
“informal” credit markets are often as high as 30% per month and the main 
borrowers are the landless labourers, the marginal and small peasant households 
whose total income is perennially below their consumption expenditures. Existence 
of usurious capital also acts as a depressant on the rural economy: very high rates 
of return promised by money-lending activities create enormous disincentives for 
productive investment, thereby perpetuating conditions of economic stagnation and 
social backwardness. Furthermore, production relations are themselves important in 
shaping these unequal exchange relations. It is precisely the size of land holdings 
and absence of sufficient collateral due to maldistribution of assets, that forces 
peasants to go to informal credit sources and as a result to self-exploit themselves. 
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Hence, for all these reasons, it is important to study the evolution of informal credit 
in the rural economy of India. What does the evidence say? 
While the share of total rural credit provided by moneylenders declined 
substantially between 1961 and 1981, the trend of rapid decline was halted in the 
early 1980s. Since then the moneylender has made a spectacular comeback in rural 
India, as can be seen in Chart 8 (details in Table A11). The new moneylenders, 
though, are quite different, in terms of social composition, from the older 
moneylenders. While the earlier brand of moneylenders had close links with landed 
property, the new crop does not seem to have that connection. Over the last two 
decades, various groups of the rural population, like traders, school teachers, 
government servants, lawyers, rich farmers, and other members of the petty 
bourgeois class, have entered this lucrative business, facilitated by the gradual but 
steady retreat of formal credit institutions. 
                              
The inter-state variation of the prevalence of informal credit, as depicted in Chart 9, 
has interesting features. First, most of the larger states have a larger share of the 
total rural credit coming from formal than from informal sources; other than Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Assam, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, all the other states had a higher 
proportion of total credit attributable to formal than to informal sources in 2003. 
Since the largest component of informal credit comes from moneylenders, most 
states seem to have had relatively lower prevalence of moneylenders.  Second, 
some of the states with relatively well developed capitalist agriculture like Punjab, 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu also have a very high prevalence of informal credit. 
In Punjab, for instance, one of the main players in the informal credit market is the 
trader-middleman known as the arhatiya, who often provides credit, sells inputs and 
also procures the output from the farmer. This typical pattern of interlinked markets 
allows the surplus product to be easily extracted from the direct producer through 
unequal exchange whereby input prices are inflated and output prices depressed. 
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Interestingly, West Bengal, which has had some limited degree of land reforms in 
the past, also shows a high percentage of non-institutional forms of rural credit.
           
H. CAPITAL FORMATION IN AGRICULTURE
An important question relating to the development of capitalist relations of 
production in Indian agriculture is whether there has been any significant trend 
towards reinvestment of surplus and capital accumulation in the agrarian economy. 
This is an important question because the development of capitalist relations 
cannot conceivably preclude capital formation on a more or less extensive scale. 
Lack of capital formation in agriculture would indicate the continued presence of 
production relations which act towards hindering the development of productive 
forces. Hence, it is important to take a look at the evidence on the trends of capital 
accumulation in the agrarian economy. What does the aggregate level data suggest 
in this regard?
Aggregate level data on gross capital formation in Indian agriculture shows 
interesting temporal patterns, as displayed in Chart 10 (details in Table A12). To 
begin with, note that gross fixed capital formation in agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries (GCFA) is composed of two parts: gross fixed capital formation in 
agriculture (GFCFA) and changes in stocks (CIS). As can be seen from Chart 10, the 
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gross value of capital stocks has more than tripled in real terms (1993-94 prices) 
over the last four decades, moving from 63 billion rupees in 1961 to 190 billion 
rupees in 1999; this growth, moreover, has been largely driven by the growth in 
fixed capital formation.   
For the period as a whole, i.e., from 1961 to 1999, gross capital formation in 
agriculture grew at about 3% per annum, a significant rate of growth by developing 
country standards. Decomposed by decades, the growth in gross capital formation 
displays significant differences. While the growth rate of GCFA was 5.05% per 
annum in the decade of the 1960s, it accelerated significantly to 8.7% per annum 
during the 1970s; thereafter, the growth rate slowed down significantly. During the 
1980s, capital formation registered a negative growth rate of -0.33% per annum 
and picked up again in the 1990s to a growth rate of 2.89% per annum during the 
1990s. What is interesting is that the slowdown in capital formation is largely 
accounted for by the deceleration of public sector capital expenditures in 
agriculture; private sector investments, though growing at a slower rate than in the 
1960s and 1970s, never became negative even as public sector investment growth 
dipped below zero; moreover, it has picked up steam during the 1990s despite poor 
performance of the public sector (Table 1.2, Gulati and Bathla, 2002). 
How does this growth in capital accumulation in the agricultural sector compare 
with the rest of the Indian economy? To answer this question, we look at the gross 
capital formation in agriculture relative to the aggregate gross domestic capital 
formation (GDCF) in the Indian economy; this information is depicted in Chart 11 
(details in Table A13). As can be seen from Chart 11, agriculture’s share in the gross 
domestic capital formation was stable at around 15% till the early 1980s; in fact it 
even displayed a slight positive trend from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. 
Thereafter, capital formation in agriculture has declined drastically as a share of the 
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total capital formation in the economy, from about 18 % in 1980 to a little more 
than 6% in 1999.
Aggregate level data on capital formation in Indian agriculture, therefore, seem to 
suggest that there was significant capital accumulation during the 1970s and 
1980s. During this period, capital formation in agriculture kept pace with capital 
formation in the rest of the Indian economy. From the decade of the 1980s, driven 
largely by changes in central government policy, agriculture has faced a state of 
relative neglect: capital formation in agriculture has not only significantly slowed 
down but has also fallen relative to the rest of the economy. This can be accounted 
for by the drastic fall in public investment in agriculture.  
I. AGGREGATE TRENDS AND SUMMARY
Our analysis of aggregate level data has revealed the following significant trends in 
the agrarian economy of India:
1. The share of GDP contributed by agriculture has steadily declined over the 
last five decades; this decline has not been matched by a decline in the share 
of the workforce engaged in agriculture. The result of these two trends has 
been a declining share of per capita value added from the agricultural sector. 
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This has essentially consigned a large section of the Indian working 
population to very low productivity (and low income) work.
2. The average size of agricultural holdings, both ownership and operational, 
has seen a steady decline over the last five decades, with the average 
ownership holding in 2002-03 being 0.73 hectares.
3. The ownership of land remains as skewed as it was five decades ago; several 
measures capture this skewed pattern of ownership in the agrarian economy. 
For instance, the Gini coefficient of landholding ownership concentration has 
remained practically unchanged between 1960-61 and 2002-03; in fact it has 
marginally increased between 1991-92 and 2002-03.
4.  While the aggregate distribution of land ownership remains as skewed as 
before, interesting and important patterns are visible within this unchanging 
aggregate picture. The share of land owned by large (10 ha or more) and 
medium (4 ha to 10 ha) landholding families has steadily declined over the 
last few decades from around 60% to 34%; the share owned by small (1 ha to 
2 ha) and marginal (less than 1 ha) landholding families has increased from 
around 21% to 43%, while the share of semi-medium (2 ha to 4 ha) families 
has remained unchanged at around 20%.
5. Parallel to this decline in the share of land held by large landholding families 
is their decline as a share of rural households; on the other hand, there is a 
large increase in the share of small and marginal landholding families among 
rural households. In 2002-03, 80% of rural households were marginal 
landholding families; the corresponding figure was 66% in 1960-61. Both 
these trends seem to indicate the declining economic, social and political 
power derived from the ownership of land in India.
6. The geographical (inter-state) variation of landholding ownership pattern 
allows us to divide the Indian states into two groups: large landholding states, 
and small landholding states. In the “large” landholding states, a substantial 
share of total area is still owned by relatively large landholding families; in 
the “small” landholding states, the share of land held by large or medium 
landholding families is very small. The former group consists of: Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, 
Rajasthan; the second group consists of: Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, 
J&K, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.  
7. Going hand-in-hand with the decline in the share of land owned by large 
landowning families, is the steady decline of tenant cultivation and its 
gradual replacement by self cultivation in Indian agriculture. The share of 
operational holdings using tenant cultivation declined from about 24% in 
1960-61 to about 10% in 2002-03. There are large geographical variations in 
the extent of tenancy, with the largest share of leased-in land as a share of 
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total operated area occurring in Punjab and Haryana, two prominent 
examples of what we have called large landholding states; Orissa has high 
prevalence of tenancy and is an example of what we have called small 
landholding states. The proportion of area owned and the proportion of area 
operated by the different size-classes are almost equal; hence, there is no 
evidence of reverse tenancy on any substantial scale at the aggregate level, 
though this might hide reverse tenancy at state or regional levels.
8. In most places where tenancy exists, the largest form of the tenancy contract 
is still sharecropping. In 2002-03, share cropping accounted for about 40% of 
the land under tenancy in India; this has more or less stayed constant over 
the decades. An important exception is Punjab and Haryana, the two states 
which have the largest share of leased-in land, where the predominant form 
of the tenancy contract is for fixed monetary payment.
9. Effective landlessness is large and has steadily increased over the past few 
decades. The share of effectively landless households in total rural 
households has increased from about 44% in 1960-61 to 60% in 2002-03.
10.Small holding agricultural production has increasingly become economically 
unviable over the years. In 2003, the average income from cultivation was 
insufficient to cover even the very low level of consumption expenditures of 
the majority of rural households. This is one of the primary causes behind the 
recent increase in rural indebtedness. This increasing difficulty of sustaining 
incomes through cultivation was probably what led close to 40% of farmers in 
2005 to suggest, during the course of a NSSO Survey, that given a chance, 
they would opt out of agriculture. Changes in the agrarian structure of India 
seem to have already brought the question of collectivization on the historical 
agenda. We return to this point in the conclusion. 
11. Disaggregating total incomes of rural households engaged in agriculture 
according to types of income show that wage income has become the main 
source of income for a large majority of the population. For about 60% of the 
rural households in 2003, the major share of income came from wage work, 
supplemented by income coming from petty commodity production, both in 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sector. Another 20% of rural households 
drew equal shares of their total income from wage work and cultivation, both 
at about 40%.  
12.Prevalence of informal sources of credit through moneylenders had seen a 
sharp decline over the 1960s and 1970s, but the decline seems to have been 
halted since the early 1980s. The moneylender has made a comeback in rural 
India, facilitated by a steady retreat of the institutions of formal credit.  
13.There was significant capital accumulation in the agricultural sector during 
the 1970s and 1980s; this has drastically fallen during the 1980s and has 
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picked up a little during the 1990s. The fall in the growth rate of capital 
formation has been largely driven by the fall in public sector investments in 
the agrarian economy.
Putting all these trends together, one is led to the following tentative conclusions 
(more in the nature of a working hypothesis): over the past few decades, the 
relations of production in the Indian agrarian economy have become increasingly 
“capitalist”; this conclusion emerges from the fact that the predominant mode of 
surplus extraction seems to be working through the institution of wage-labour, the 
defining feature of capitalism. Articulated to the global capitalist-imperialist system, 
the development of capitalism in the periphery has of course not led to the growth 
of income and living standards of the vast majority of the population. On the 
contrary, the agrarian economy has continued to stagnate and the majority of the 
rural population has been consigned to a life of poverty and misery. 
Aggregate level data suggests that the two main forms through which the surplus 
product of direct producers is extracted are (a) surplus value through the institution 
of wage-labour (which rests on equal exchange), and (b) surplus value through 
unequal exchange  (which mainly affects petty producers) where input prices are 
inflated and output prices deflated for the direct producers due to the presence of 
monopoly, monopsony and interlinking of markets; semi-feudal forms of surplus 
product extraction, through the institution of tenant cultivation and share cropping, 
has declined over time. Merchant and usurious capital continues to maintain a 
substantial presence in the life of the rural populace, both of which manage to 
appropriate a part of the surplus value created through wage-labour, apart from 
directly extracting surplus value from petty producers through unequal exchange. 
The process of class differentiation has been considerably slowed down and 
complicated due to the steady incorporation of the Indian economy into the global 
capitalist system, which has supported and even encouraged the growth of a large 
“informal” production sector. This informal production sector can be best 
understood as being involved in petty commodity production, both of agricultural 
and nonagricultural commodities. Petty commodity production refers to the 
organization of production where the producer owns the means of production and 
primarily uses family and other forms of non-wage labour in the production process. 
Petty commodity production is exploited mainly by merchant and usurious capital 
where the main form of surplus extraction is through the mechanism of unequal 
exchange and not through the institution of wage-labour; unequal exchange is often 
facilitated and maintained through interlinked product, labour and credit markets. 
The coexistence of both wage-labour and petty commodity production, whereby 
landless labourers, marginal farmers and small farmers participate in both, in one 
as free labour and in the other as owner-producer, has impeded the development of 
proletarian class consciousness and complicated the task of revolutionary politics. 
This is a point we return to in the concluding section but before that we turn to a 
detailed study of petty commodity production in the non-agricultural sector.  
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PART II: INDUSTRY6
A. INTRODUCTION
After three decades of planned industrialization and another three decades of 
increasingly market-based development, what types of production relations are 
found in Indian manufacturing? What are the main modes of surplus extraction? Is 
Indian industry capitalist? If so what is the nature of this capitalism? Is it dominated 
by industrial, finance or merchant capital? To address these questions, we present 
macroeconomic data from five rounds of the National Sample Surveys (NSS) of the 
unorganized manufacturing sector from 1984 to the present, supplemented with 
micro case studies. 
Traditional accounts of Indian industry tended to focus on large-scale or “modern” 
industry, since it was assumed that this sector would grow rapidly to accommodate 
all industrial employment. The working class was also imagined similarly as 
consisting of urban workers in large industry. The workers and small producers in 
the “traditional” or small-scale industry, though numerically strong, occupied an 
ambiguous position in Marxist theory for two reasons: one, the revolutionary subject 
was the modern large-scale industrial working class, and two, the revolutionary 
experiences of Russia and China  showed that peasants and other small producers 
could, depending on the specific historical conditions, be  reactionary forces, allies 
of the modern industrial working class, or a revolutionary force in their own right. 
The present study is motivated by a desire to understand the material conditions 
confronting the vast majority of the industrial working class, which labors in the 
“informal sector.” Large-scale industry has not expanded as expected in India. The 
share of large industry (factories of >100 workers) in manufacturing employment 
grew from around 5% in 1900 to 30% in 1980 and thereafter has declined to around 
25 % (Roy 2000). While low employment elasticity in large-scale industry has been 
blamed on imported capital-intensive technologies, the other less emphasized part 
of the story is extensive use of informal (casual and sub-contracted) employment by 
formal firms particularly for labor-intensive work, particularly in the post-1991 
period. This once again points to the necessity of acquiring a good grasp of the 
empirical realities of India’s informal manufacturing workforce. 
To a first approximation, relations of production in large formal sector firms may be 
termed “industrial capitalist.” We do not discuss these further. This study limits 
itself to the informal sector. According to the latest National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO) survey covering the period 2005-2006, 36.44 million of India’s 
45 million industrial workers (i.e. about 75%) were employed in the informal 
manufacturing sector (Government of India, 2008a). The informal economy 
accounts for 40% of industrial GDP. Here relations of production and modes of 
6 In this study we use the term “Industry” to refer only to the manufacturing sector and ex-
clude mining and construction from our analysis.
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surplus extraction are more complex than those prevailing in formal industry. 
However it is imperative to develop a theoretical understanding of these relations 
so that the concept of the “working class” does not continue to ignore the vast 
majority of the working population in India. 
Across all three sectors, as with most developing countries, in India a large portion 
of the employment (by some estimates up to 90%) is classified as “unorganized” 
(Govt. of India terminology) or “informal” (academic and general policy usage). An 
informal firm is not registered with the government and typically does not pay any 
taxes, nor is required to abide by labor and other laws. Informal employment means 
that work is not regular, secure, or governed by formal/written contracts, and 
usually no benefits (health, retirement, other social security) are paid. Although the 
exact size of the informal economy in developing countries is hard to estimate, 
there is little disagreement that the vast majority of employment is still outside the 
formal sector. Even leaving aside agriculture, the informal sector accounts for 48 
percent of non-agricultural employment in North Africa, 51 per cent in Latin 
America, 65 per cent in Asia, and 72 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa.7 
This purely statistical or administrative aspect of informality should be distinguished 
from more substantive issues of firm size and production and exchange relations, 
although naturally the two interact in a complex way (for e.g. costs of conforming to 
government regulations are often cited as a reason for remaining small or 
undertaking “horizontal” as opposed to “vertical” expansion). Discussions of the 
informal sector often conflate multiple closely related yet distinct “axes of 
differentiation.” These are shown in Figure 1. In this schematic, the formal-informal 
distinction itself is restricted only to the question of State regulation of economic 
activity (“registered” versus “unregistered”). For example, for statistical purposes 
the Indian manufacturing sector is divided into two parts: those firms that are 
registered under the Factories Act of 1948 (“organized manufacturing sector”, 
hereafter formal sector) and those that are unregistered because the number of 
employees is less than 20 (in official GOI parlance, the “unorganized manufacturing 
sector” and hereafter the informal sector). The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 
collects data on formal firms. The National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) 
includes in its surveys of informal manufacturing all firms which are not covered 
under the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and which are not public sector firms. 
This is the universe of informal manufacturing as far as official data is concerned. 
Several surveys have been carried out in India since the 1950s at periodic intervals 
by the NSSO to estimate the size and contributions to GDP, of the small-scale and 
the informal manufacturing sector (both urban and rural). 
Other than the formal-informal axis much attention has been focused on the large-
scale/small-scale (firm size) axis, and informal manufacturing is often equated with 
small-scale production. This can be taken to be true as a first approximation with 
7 See Jhabvala, Sudarshan and Unni (2003) for a discussion of statistical problems.
33
the strong caveat that not all workers employed in the formal sector are “formal 
workers” since casual labor employed via contractors and sub-contractors forms a 
substantial part of formal sector firms. The ASI collects some data on the casual and 
contingent workforce in the formal sector. We do not present this data here. The 
point of the schematic is to draw attention to the more substantive aspects of the 
formal-informal divide that relate to forms of exploitation (real versus formal 
subsumption of labor to capital), relations of production (ownership of means of 
production versus wage labor) and the type of circuit of capital (need versus 
accumulation).
The share of small-scale and informal industry in employment has been high since 
colonial times and NSS data since 1984 shows that informal manufacturing has held 
on to its employment share, perhaps even expanded it, in recent times. According 
to the most recent NSS round (2005-2006), 85% of firms in informal manufacturing 
were own-account enterprises (employing no wage-workers), while 10% were firms 
employing less than 6 workers, and 5 % employed more than 6 but less than 20 
workers (Government of India, 2008a). The overwhelming number of own-account 
firms in informal manufacturing is sometimes celebrated as a type of 
“entrepreneurial capitalism.” However this is misleading and elides the fact that 
surplus extraction via unequal exchange plays a significant role in this sector.8 
Given that informal firms display not only “independent commodity production” and 
capitalist relations, but also a large variety of “putting-out” modes as well, we 
present a typology to characterize production and exchange relations in the 
informal sector. The axes of the typology are “control over capital” (fixed and 
working, self or other), “control over labor” (process and product, self or other) and 
“control over market” (product and factor, self or other). 
For a long time the relations of production and the manner in which surplus is 
extracted from the majority of the working class has been neglected or 
underemphasized, at times simply being labeled “pre-capitalist,” or “non-capitalist,” 
a term which does not tell us much about the actually existing relations. The 
informal working class is also not easily recognized as working class from a Marxian 
perspective, as it may not be doubly free (either not free of the means of 
production, or not freely mobile, or both). NSS data over the past three decades as 
well as individual case-studies show that the particular type of capitalism found in 
Indian informal manufacturing is characterized by a large number of very small 
firms locked in unequal exchange relationships with merchant and finance capital. 
Broadly speaking formal rather than real subsumption of labor to capital, and 
extraction of absolute rather than relative surplus value characterizes many firms. 
Surplus extraction via the “conventional” wage-labor route is compounded by 
unequal exchange, unpaid domestic labor, labor bondage, contingent or casual 
labor, and gender and caste hierarchies.
8 For details refer to the previous section on agriculture.
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Figure 1: The axes of differentiation (MnOP = means of production, Red 
line indicates the characteristics usually associated with the formal sector, 
the green line, the informal sector)
B. MARX ON “INFORMAL INDUSTRY”
For the past fifty or sixty years the question of the transition to capitalism has 
dogged the development literature, although not always recognized as such. The 
problem of replacement of “traditional” pre-capitalist (feudal and petty commodity) 
production relations by “modern” capitalist relations was of course the explicit 
problem of classical development economics. The same problem later resurfaced in 
the context of the “formal-informal” divide and in this form it continues to this day. 
Something akin to a sustained and sophisticated debate over the nature of 
production relations or the mode of production in agriculture did not occur for Indian 
industry, although many of the same issues prevail there as well. Further, many of 
the issues that motivated early Marxist controversies over the role of the peasantry 
in the socialist revolution are relevant to the analysis of small-scale industrial 
production as well. 
The question “is Indian agriculture capitalist?” immediately raised the question 
“what is capitalism?” The following principle criteria emerged from that debate: 
class differentiation and proletarianization of labor, generalized or expanding 
commodity production, and surplus accumulation and reinvestment. Then the 
question becomes to what extent does doubly-free labor, commodity production 
(production for exchange rather than use) and accumulation characterize a certain 
sector of the economy, for our purposes Industry. One can safely say that large-
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scale, formal industry displays all these characteristics. However, in the informal 
manufacturing sector the story is more complex and these criteria apply in varying 
degrees. Generalized commodity production, rather than production for use 
dominates, however self-employment exists alongside wage-labor to a significant 
degree and data on firm sizes shows that reinvestment of surplus into expanded 
reproduction  may not occur. Rather the amount of surplus available for 
reinvestment may be greatly reduced partly due to low productivity and partly due 
to siphoning off of the surplus by merchant and finance capitalists.
Marx had much more to say about the transition from small-scale and cottage 
industry to capitalist factory production as compared to the transition from peasant 
to capitalist farming. In Chapters 14 and 15 of Capital Vol. 1, he discusses at length 
the development of modern industry in England and parts of Germany. The sheer 
diversity of production relations, including independent commodity production, 
putting-out and wage-labor, described by Marx, calls to mind contemporary 
conditions in Indian informal industry. In these pages Marx appears to be concerned 
about two things. One, under what conditions do modern large-scale factories 
emerge from existing decentralized workshops and domestic production. And two, 
how is small-scale and domestic industry transformed when it becomes articulated 
within a dominant industrial capitalist mode of production. Both these questions are 
pertinent for us today.
Marx notes regarding the emergence of large industry:
To carry on trade as a manufacture, with concentration of workers, is 
profitable only under exceptional conditions, because competition is at its 
greatest between those workers who desire to work at home…and because 
the capitalist, by scattering the work around, saves any outlay on workshops 
etc. Nevertheless, the position of this specialized worker, who, although he 
works at home, does so for a capitalist, is very different from that of the 
independent craftsmen, who works for his own customers. (Marx 1992, pp. 
462-463)
Here two issues of contemporary relevance are raised. Firstly, outsourcing to 
smaller workshops can, under some circumstance, be more convenient, from the 
capitalist’s point of view, than centralizing production in a factory, something we 
observe repeatedly in the Indian experience, particularly in the neoliberal period. 
One contemporary account of artisanal industry in India puts it thus:
The procurement of means of labour and the task of training for quality pro-
duction are no longer concerns of the capitalist. Just as these are a bother of 
the labourer, so also is the maintenance of the machinery and steady supply 
of electricity and water. In this manner, almost the entire cost of managing 
sustained production has been transferred to producer. (Sahasrabudhey 
2001, p. 3)
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Secondly, the home-based artisan who works for merchant capital, though he 
appears superficially similar to the independent craftsman of yore, is also very 
different from him. In fact, Marx asserts:
This modern “domestic industry” has nothing except the name in common 
with old-fashioned  industry, the existence of which presupposes independent 
urban handicrafts, independent peasant farming and above all, a dwelling-
house for the worker and his family. That kind of Industry has now been 
converted into an external department of the factory…Besides the factory 
worker, the workers engaged in manufacture, and the handicraftsmen, whom 
it concentrates in large masses at one spot, and directly commands, capital 
also sets another army in motion, by means of invisible threads: the 
outworkers in the domestic industries, who live in the large towns as well as 
being scattered over the countryside. An example: the shirt factory of Messrs 
Tillie at Londonderry, which employs 1000 workers in the factory itself, and 
9000 outworkers spread over the country districts. (Marx 1992, pp. 590-591, 
emphasis added)
Capital thus organizes production in a familiar dual mode: large factories are 
articulated with smaller workshops dependent upon the factory. Exploitation takes 
different forms under these two circumstances.
In the so-called domestic industries…exploitation is still more shameless than 
in modern manufacture, because the workers’ power of resistance declines 
with their dispersal; because a whole series of plundering parasites insinuate 
themselves between the actual employer and the worker he employs. (ibid, 
p. 591, emphasis added)
Both the factors alluded to in the quote above remain relevant in Indian informal 
industry today. The dispersal of the working class or, in some instances, the failure 
of the working class to aggregate in the first place, results in the breaking of labor’s 
resistance to exploitation by capital. And the rising importance of middlemen 
creates channels for surplus extraction via unequal exchange.
Thus, in reading Marx on the evolution of modern industry one is often struck by the 
resonance with Indian manufacturing today. The widespread prevalence of putting-
out relations, the preponderance of merchant capital and of formal subsumption of 
labor seems to suggest a type of capitalism that precedes in historical time, the 
“full-fledged” industrial capitalism of Western Europe and North America. Does this 
mean that the Indian economy is on the same transition path as the advanced 
industrial economies? An awareness of the historical context cautions against any 
such straightforward interpretation. The issue of the transition to industrial 
capitalism and the disappearance of the informal sector is a very controversial one 
in the literature and we do not enter into this debate here. Though it is worth 
pointing out that in some ways this debate over contemporary economic reality 
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mirrors the debate in Indian economic history over the fate of “traditional industry” 
under colonialism.
In that debate, the “deindustrialization/nationalist” school maintained that 
traditional industry was decimated due to competition from cheap manufactured 
goods and deliberate colonial trade and industrial policy.9 A more recent 
“revisionist” school countered that continuity rather than rupture marks the 
artisanal landscape in colonial and post-colonial India (Roy, 1994). Simmons (1984) 
offers a good overview of this debate along with key sources. The challenge lies in 
reconstructing a picture that shows elements of continuity as well as change, while 
maintaining a focus on the material conditions that keeps the working class 
exploited and trapped in low productivity/low-wage work. This is precisely what 
Marx hints at when he calls our attention to the differences and the similarities of 
domestic and cottage industry subordinated to capital compared to pre-capitalist 
artisanal production.  
At the very least it can be said that rather than being annihilated, several types of 
traditional industries survived with changes into the 20th century, and even grew in 
size in some cases.
“In some cases, the growth of major craft towns of colonial India has been 
truly staggering in the last 50 years. Surat at the turn of the century probably 
employed about 5-6,000 weavers in silk and lace. Today, the direct 
descendant of weaving, the powerloom, provides employment to about half a 
million. Moradabad brassware engaged 7-8,000 full-time workers in 1924. In 
the 1990s, an estimate places the town's metal workers at 150,000. Not more 
than a few thousands were found in the carpets in Mirzapur-Bhadohi area in 
the interwar period. 300,000 is the approximate figure in the 1990s. These 
cases capture a steadily increasing share of the informal sector in industrial 
wage-labour.” (Roy 1999)
Marx has sometimes been read in teleological fashion as asserting that the 
particular transition from petty commodity production to small workshops and 
domestic industry articulated with capitalism (putting-out) to large-scale factories 
will be repeated wherever capitalism develops. However, it is also worth noting that 
the period over which this transition occurs is around 300 years (from the 17th 
century to the 19th centuries).  One important factor that Marx did not incorporate in 
his analysis is imperialism; later Marxists drew attention to imperialism and the 
uneven development that characterizes the world capitalist system. It has been 
argued that the incorporation of the Indian economy into the global capitalist 
system creates conditions for the perpetuation of the informal sector and other low-
9 The early nationalist writers included R.C.Dutt and Rajani Palme Dutt. A more recent writer 
holding this view is Bagchi (1976). An oft-cited macro statistic in this regard is Paul Bairoch’s 
estimates of the “levels of industrialization” according to which India accounted for 25% of 
world manufacturing output in 1750, 8.6% in 1860 and 1.7% in 1900. (quoted in Simmons 
1984, Table 1)
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productivity activities. To this must be added another caveat. Modern large-sale 
industry has in general displayed great capital intensity and a corresponding failure 
to provide employment to a large fraction of society (even in China, the new 
manufacturing powerhouse, the secondary sector currently employs only 23% of 
the labor force). The persistence of small-scale production as “employer of last 
report” raises important questions for the type of industrialization that should drive 
the development process. We defer further comments on this issue until the 
concluding section.
C. THE FORMAL AND THE INFORMAL IN INDIAN INDUSTRY
With the background laid out above, let us proceed to some statistics on the Indian 
experience of the past few decades. Sectoral shares in employment and output for 
India over the past century are shown in Figure 2a and Figure 2b. These data, 
combined from various sources, are to be interpreted cautiously (not least because 
“India” refers to a different geographical region pre and post-Independence). 
However the salient feature is relatively uncontroversial: a decline in agricultural 
employment and an increase in services followed by industry. The decline in 
agriculture’s share of employment has been much slower than decline in share of 
output, with consequences as noted in the previous section. Depending upon the 
exact definition, the manufacturing sector’s current share in GDP is somewhere 
between 20-25%. Total employment in this sector is about 45 million (about 18 % of 
the labor force). The share of industrial sector in employment has increased, albeit 
slowly, since the 1980s (14 to 18%)
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Tables 1 and 2 show the relative proportions of the formal and informal economies 
in employment (as of 2000) and output (as of 2003) for the three sectors. Formal 
firms accounted for around 60% of output and informal firms for 40%. According the 
latest NSSO survey (covering the period 2005-2006) 36.44 million workers were 
employed in the informal manufacturing sector. Thus around 75 % of the 
manufacturing workforce is employed in the informal sector.
Table 1: Percentage share of formal versus informal contribution to GDP 
in the three sectors, 2002-2003
Sector Formal (% of 
GDP)
Informal (% of 
GDP)
Total 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing
4.1 95.9 100.0
Mining, manufacturing, 
electricity and construction
60.5 39.5 100.0
Services 53.1 46.9 100.0
Total 43.3 56.7 100.0
Source: Sharma and Chitkara (2006) Measuring Contribution of Informal 
Sector/Informal Employment to GDP, Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics 
(Delhi Group)
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Table 2: Percentage share of formal versus informal employment in 
the three sectors, 1999-2000 
Sector Formal (% of 
employment)
Informal (% of 
employment)
Total 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing
0.86 99.14 100.0
Mining, manufacturing, 
electricity and construction
24.47 75.53 100.0
Services 24.60 75.40 100.0
Source: Saha, Kar and Bhaskaran (2004) Measuring Informal Economy through 
Income and Expenditure Surveys, Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics (Delhi 
Group)
As might be expected from its large size, the scope of informal activity is similarly 
extensive. In India small-scale, informal industry produces food products, 
beverages, cotton, wool, and silk textiles, wood and paper products, leather and 
chemical products, metal products, electrical and transport equipment and repair 
services of various kinds including repair of capital equipment. NSSO data indicate 
that the food, textile and garment industries are the largest employers in the 
informal manufacturing sector. Figure 3 shows the industries that account for about 
90% of informal employment.
One main cause of anxiety regarding the development of industry in India has been 
that the formal sector has displayed low employment elasticities. Figure 4 shows 
that formal sector employment (industry and services) has been stagnant since the 
1980s. In particular the post-reform period has seen growing informalization. The 
share of large industry (usually defined as composed of firms employing more than 
100 workers) in manufacturing employment grew from around 5% in 1900 to 30% 
in 1980 and thereafter has declined to around 25 % (Figure 5).
Contrariwise, as mentioned earlier, the share of small-scale and informal industry in 
employment has been high since colonial times and NSSO data since 1984 
(discussed in more detail in the next section) shows that informal manufacturing 
has held on to its employment share, perhaps even expanded it, in recent times.10
10 At the statistical level a vital caveat to NSS data is the underestimation of the informal 
sector’s contribution to employment and income. According to one study of the Gujarat 
ceramic manufactures industry (Das 2003) only about 3% of the total number of units 
surveyed were reflected in the official statistics and similarly the official data on 
employment was less than 2% of the study’s estimate. We take this issue up in a later 
section.
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Figure 4: Employment in the formal sector (1980-2003) in millions (Source: 
C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh11)
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The persistence of small-scale and cottage industry, both due to its acting as a 
reserve for surplus labor and in part due to active government policy of support, on 
the one hand, and support for large-scale modern industry on the other hand have 
resulted in a firm size distribution displaying what Mazumdar and Sarkar (2008) 
refer to as the “missing middle.” This refers to the low proportion of firms 
employing more than 50 but less than 1000 or more workers (Figure 6). In part the 
explanation may be found in incentives to reduce small firm size to less than 50 
official workers in order to avoid compliance with labor and other laws. Beyond a 
11 http://www.authorstream.com/presentation/Mudki-19349-Jayati-Ghosh-Recent-employ-
ment-trends-India-China-unfortunate-convergence-Asian-century-similar-eco-as-Entertain-
ment-ppt-powerpoint/
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certain size, where non-registration is not an option, economies of scale may result 
in large firm sizes. 
In passing we note that the reasons why small firms are unable or unwilling to grow 
are complex and are the subject of several official and academic studies. Figure 7 
displays some of the key results from a survey of 1212 small firms (Morris et al 
2001). These are responses to the question “Encircle the three most important 
factors that have restricted your growth and development and rank them in order of 
importance”. The scores have been adjusted for the rank, and fewer than three 
responses.
D. PRODUCTION RELATIONS: A FIRST LOOK
Rather than focusing on firm size (large versus small), legal criteria (registered 
versus unregistered) or employment regimes (regular, semi-regular, casual), in this 
study our aim is to investigate the production relations and modes of surplus 
extraction found in informal manufacturing firms. Harris (1982) comments referring 
to categories based on firm size or scale (such as number of employees, size of 
assets etc.).
“For analytical purposes these categories are quite clearly of very limited 
value because they mostly rest upon numerically defined classes and may 
subsume quite different forms of the production process and of relations of 
production.” (p. 945)
The 62nd round of the National Sample Survey carried out in 2005-06 contains the 
most recent national-level data on the informal manufacturing sector in India. Data 
is also available from previous rounds conducted in 2000-2001, 1994-1995, 1989-
1990 and 1984-1985 giving a broad overview of the evolution of informal industry 
over the past 25 years. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of employment (in %) in manufacturing firms by employment 
size groups. (ASI data) (Source: Mazumdar and Sarkar 2008)
44
The first thing to note is that the number of informal manufacturing firms as well as 
the number of workers has remained more or less constant over the past 25 years 
(Figure 8).
How do informal manufacturing entreprises and workers vary across the states? 
Figures 9 and 10 show the state-wise distribution of informal enterprise as well as 
informal workers. Two states, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh account for 30 
percent of all informal manufacturing enterprises as well as informal workers in the 
country. Only the top ten states are shown in the figure (see NSS 62nd round Report 
524, Statement 3b and Report 525, Statement 5A for entire list).
Depending on whether and how many wage-workers are employed in the firm, we 
can categorize informal firms based on NSSO data as follows (the labels are ours): 
1. Petty-proprietorships: These are called “Own Account Manufacturing Enterprises” 
(OAMEs) in the NSSO data. The key defining feature is that no wage-workers are 
employed. Use of family labor is common and many firms are situated on household 
premises.
2. Marginal capitalist: These are called “Non Directory Manufacturing 
Establishments” (NDMEs) in the NSSO data. They have at least one wage-worker 
but no more than 5 wage and family workers taken together.
3. Small Capitalist: These are called “Directory Manufacturing Establishments” 
(DMEs) in the NSSO data. These employ more than 5 but less than 20 workers (at 
which point they should be included in the Annual Survey of Industries).
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Figure 9: Percentage share of informal manufacturing 
enterprises
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
We
st B
en
ga
l
Utt
ar 
Pra
de
sh
An
dh
ra 
Pra
de
sh
Ta
mi
l N
ad
u
Ma
ha
ras
htr
a
Ka
rna
tak
a
Or
iss
a
Ma
dh
ya 
Pra
de
sh Bih
ar
Ke
ral
a
State
%
Figure 10: Percentage share of informal manufacturing workers
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
We
st 
Be
ng
al
Ut
tar
 Pr
ad
es
h
Ta
mi
l N
ad
u
An
dh
ra 
Pr
ad
es
h
Ma
ha
ras
htr
a
Or
iss
a
Ka
rna
tak
a
Gu
jar
at
Ma
dh
ya
 P
rad
es
h
Bih
ar
State
%
Petty-proprietorships are by far the most common type of production relation in 
both rural and urban areas, in terms of both number of firms and number of 
workers. However, relatively more marginal and small capitalist firms are found in 
urban areas as compared to rural areas. The rural and urban percentage shares for 
2005-2006 are shown in Figure 11a and Figure 11b and the all-India shares of firms 
and workers are shown for the past 25 years in Figure 12a and Figure 12b.
46
 NSSO data also reveal that unpaid family members and other non-hired helpers 
make up a very large part of the informal industrial working class. While 52% of 
informal workers are “working owners,” and 24% are “hired workers,” the 
remaining, fully 24% are categorized as “other workers,” i.e. unpaid domestic 
workers. The majority of hired workers (85%) are male while the majority of “other 
workers” (59%) are female (Government of India, 2008). 
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 E. ASSETS 
In order to get a more detailed picture of these firms we next present some data on 
types of assets owned and value added in manufacturing activity. In addition we 
present some data on wage and profits shares in the aggregate in this sector. 
Figure 13 shows that the workshop premise or home forms the single largest asset 
for informal firms, accounting for 60-80% of assets.
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The percentage growth in market value of fixed assets owned by the three types of 
informal enterprises over the period from 1994-95 to 2005-06 (adjusted for inflation 
using the wholesale price index), is shown in the table below.
Table 3: Growth rate of fixed assets (1994-95 to 2005-06)
PP % growth 23.32
MC % growth 34.82
SC % growth 51.03
NSSO data also suggest that rented assets form an important part of the operation 
of the informal manufacturing economy. In 2005-2006, across all three types of 
informal firms, 30% of total assets were hired. While hired assets formed a greater 
part of total assets for marginal and small capitalist firms, even for petty-
proprietorships, nearly 25% of total assets were hired. Taken together with the data 
presented later in the paper on use of credit, we note that so-called “petty 
commodity producers” are in fact separated to a significant degree from the means 
of production and that the circuit of capital for informal firms starts with money or 
credit. In certain types of putting-out arrangements what appears to be petty 
commodity production is in fact disguised wage-labor. We defer a more detailed 
discussion of this to Section I and the concluding section.
F. GROSS VALUE ADDED
To calculate the gross value added in manufacturing two quantities are first 
defined:
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1. Operating Expenses: “The total values of raw materials, electricity, fuel, 
lubricants and auxiliary materials consumed; cost of maintenance, services 
purchased and other expenses incurred during the reference period.” (Government 
of India 2008c, p. 14)
2. Receipts: “The sale value of products and by-products manufactured by the 
enterprise together with the value of services rendered to other concerns…” (ibid)
Then, Gross Value Added (GVA) = Total Receipts – Total Operating Expenses
While, as expected, value added has increased far more rapidly in formal 
manufacturing as compared to the informal sector (Figure 14), it is interesting to 
note that GVA has been increasing rapidly in the past decade across the informal 
sector. Figure 15 shows this by removing the trendline for the formal sector. 
Coupled with the fact that total informal industrial employment has not grown 
similarly over the same period, we can infer than labor productivity has been 
increasing in this sector.
Table 4 gives summary aggregate statistics for wage and profit shares as well as 
average wages and profits per worker. An important caveat of theoretical as well as 
practical importance must be mentioned here when considering the value-added 
figures. Micro case studies reveal that in situations where long supply chains exist 
linking the producer with the final consumer, the sale price of the producer (the 
informal firm) is only a small part of the retail price paid by the final consumer. 
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TABLE 4: Gross Value Added and Wages Share for 
Informal Firms
PP MC SC
Aggregate GVA (Billions 
Rs) 280.61 211.20 384.05
Wage Share (Billions Rs.) - 124.71 206.85
Profit Share (Billions Rs.) - 86.51 177.41
No. of workers (millions) 23.69 5.78 6.98
GVA per firm (Rs)
19203.
00
119302.
00
558513.
00
GVA per worker (Rs)
11846.
00
36543.0
0
55052.0
0
number of workers/firm 1.62 3.26 10.15
Annual 
emolument/worker (Rs) -
21576.0
0
29635.0
0
Profit/per worker (Rs) -
14967.0
0
25417.0
0
Source: Report 526, and Report 525, Statements 10 and 
12
This problem is particularly accentuated when the value chain is global. As 
Chakrabarti and Varman (2009) note in their study of the Kanpur leather cluster, 
“almost 80 per cent of the final price of the shoe goes to the long chain of 
middlemen who operate only in the post-production stage. Or in other words, 
Figure 15: Gross Value Added by type of firm in the informal 
sector
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four-fifths of the ‘value addition’ of shoes in the global value chain actually 
adds no value to the product.”
Heintz (2003, 2006) has developed a model in the “unequal exchange tradition” of 
Emmanuel, Prebisch and Singer, that attempts to capture the unequal distributional 
consequences of a global production system where “large retailers or brand-name 
corporations set up a decentralized system of production and distribution.” Here 
Actual production is subcontracted out to small producers who face 
extremely competitive conditions (Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000, Bonacich and 
Appelbaum 2000, Gereffi 1994). Retailers and brand-name multinationals 
enjoy some degree of market power which they can use to keep prices low 
for the goods they purchase or to earn rents through the development of 
monopolistic brand identities. (Heintz 2003)
He further argues that
by combining the specific insights of global commodity chain analysis with 
the theoretical innovations of the unequal exchange traditions, a model of 
these relationships can be developed that explores the distributive 
consequences of the expansion of globalized manufacturing tied to affluent 
consumer markets through the institutional linkages of global commodity 
chains. 
We note in passing that this issue is still relevant even when commodity chains are 
only regional or national in scope.
G. CREDIT 
According to NSSO data in 2005-06 outstanding loans were 21.6% of total fixed 
assets owned, at the all India level. While nearly 50% of the credit in rural and 
urban areas came from government agencies, public sector and cooperative banks, 
or other institutional sources (such as the Khadi and Village Industries Commission), 
private money-lenders along with other informal sources such as friends and 
relatives accounted for 15% of outstanding loans at the all-India level. Expectedly, 
formal sources of credit were more important for small capitalists as compared to 
marginal capitalists and petty-proprietors. Petty-proprietors are the worst hit by 
money-lenders. The percentage of loans from money-lenders to rural petty-
proprietors has actually increased substantially in the period from 1994-95 to 2005-
06, while it has decreased for every other category as seen in the figure. The figure 
of 25% can be compared to the proportion of loans going to farmers from money-
lenders reported in the section on agriculture.
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Figure 16: Percentage of loans to informal manufacturing enterprises 
coming from money-lenders (blue: 1994-95, magenta: 2005-06)
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The usurious nature of money-lender credit is apparent when we note that the 
“annual interest payable as a percentage of loan amount outstanding” is on 
average ten percentage points higher (at 26%) than formal sources of credit 
(around 15%).
H. SHORTCOMINGS OF NSS DATA
Das (2003) has carried out a micro-level case study of the ceramic ware 
manufacturing sub-sector in Gujarat specifically to uncover the shortcomings of 
national level NSS data, which result in part from problems with including/excluding 
specific sub-sectors below the two-digit level National Industry Classification (NIC). 
The key points that emerge from this study are:
1. At a greater level of disaggregation of industrial classification it is seen that NSS 
data has improved vastly over time to include more and more previously missed 
types of industries. For example early NSS data (1978-79) estimated no informal 
enterprises in manufacturing or processing of cotton textiles, and in drugs, 
cosmetics and washing and cleaning preparations, both of which consist of several 
informal units in Gujarat (and most likely elsewhere as well). 
2. The National Sample Surveys are likely to underestimate, in some cases severely, 
the number of informal enterprises and as a result the size of informal employment. 
For example, the ceramic ware sub-sector had one surveyed unit and an estimated 
eight units in the informal sector according to 1994-95 NSS data. Das (2003) found 
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at least 164 and possibly as many as 229 informal units. The corresponding 
employment estimates were 24 workers for ceramic ware industry in Gujarat 
according to NSS (1994-95) data and anywhere between 1,292-1,802 workers as 
per the Das (2003) study. Thus only about 3% of the total number of units surveyed 
were reflected in the official statistics and similarly the official data on employment 
was less than 2% of the study’s estimate.
3. Annual emoluments for all non OAME’s according to NSS 2005-2006 is Rs. 
26,682. Das (2003) reveals wages around Rs. 18,000 (assuming regular year-long 
employment). The piece rate system was widely prevalent though it does not 
feature prominently in the official statistics.
4. Only around 28% of informal enterprises had no hired workers (the macro NSS 
data reports a much larger percentage). Around 88% of informal units were single 
proprietor units and nearly 50% of employees in informal units were family 
members (unpaid labor).
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSING PRODUCTION RELATION IN THE 
INFORMAL SECTOR
While the NSSO data serves well as a first pass on the types of production relations 
in the informal sector, the true complexity is revealed only via micro case studies. 
Using examples from different informal industries including Agra footwear, Lucknow 
Chikan, Gujarat Ceramics, and UP and TN Handlooms, and a 1991 survey of 1500 
artisan households involved in 15 different export-oriented handicraft industries, we 
offer a schematic look at these production relations and the principal ways in which 
surplus extraction is facilitated.
The variety of production relations observed empirically can be captured in a simple 
matrix (see Table 5) where the two axes are control over labor process and product, 
and control over capital. A simple dichotomy can be made between self-
direction/ownership and other-direction/ownership. 
The informal manufacturing sector displays a great variety of production relations in 
which the producer retains or losses control over the means of production and the 
labor process to varying degrees. The “classical artisan” mode consists of say a 
weaver, a metal-worker, a leather-worker who owns his own means of production, 
works in his own house or workshop and produces for the market. She or he also 
retains control over a self-directed labor process. However, as capitalism 
undermines the conditions of existence of independent commodity production,  self-
ownership of capital does not necessarily mean self-direction in the labor process. 
Recall Marx’s comment above, with respect to the domestic worker that the
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…the position of this specialized worker, who, although he works at home, 
does so for a capitalist, is very different from that of the independent 
craftsmen, who works for his own customers. (Marx, 1992, p. 462-463)
Capitalist relations may thus show up first not in the separation of the producer 
from the means of production but rather in a slow loss of control over the process 
and product of labor. Or conversely, ownership of the means of production does not 
automatically entail ownership of the product of labor or control over the process of 
labor. 
The “putting-out” mode of production is historically a result of the subordination of 
artisanal production to merchant capital. Typically a merchant or his representative 
supplies orders (and in some instances raw materials or working capital) to the 
producer and collects the finished product at an agreed upon price or piece-wage. 
One account of the contemporary small-scale industry describes the situation thus:
Under the new system capitalists exercise tight control in the market of raw 
material and finished products. Production is organized through a supply of 
raw material to sites of production spread out in houses and huts. A battery 
of middlemen and contractors operates at several levels. In many cases 
these levels are so numerous that the producer knows nothing about the 
master. Wage and quality controls are exercised by middlemen. This 
arrangement has spread quickly in textile, hosiery, readymade clothes, 
electrical devices, small machines and leather works. Of late, ironwork, clay-
work, carpentry and stone work has also been brought within the ambit of 
this system. We are witnessing a transformation of villages, mohallas and 
towns into large factories, a transformation, which has no precedent. 
(Sahasrabudhey, 2001)
Today putting-out goes by the name of sub-contracting and is a widely discussed 
phenomenon in mainstream international economics as global commodity chains 
become increasingly elaborated. The putting-out variations found in Indian informal 
industry are described in Table 5.12
PO-I or Putting-out variation I- The producer works on his/her own premises with 
own equipment and own working capital, in a self-directed labor-process but hands 
over product to one or few middlemen. He/she may also be dependent upon the 
same merchant for access to working capital or credit. This type of arrangements is 
found among other places in the Agra footwear industry.
PO-II or Putting-out variation II- The producer works on own premises with own 
equipment but with borrowed working capital, in a self-directed labor-process and 
hands over product to merchant capitalist or his representative. This is also a 
commonly found type of relation in the handloom and powerloom sectors.
12 We thank Mohan Rao for the framework behind the typology depicted in Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 5: A typology of production relations in the Indian informal 
manufacturing sector
Labor
Capital
Self product and 
process
Self process, 
other product
Other product 
and process
Self fixed and 
working
Classical artisan/
independent 
producer
PO-I Rare
Self fixed,
other working
Rare PO-II PO-IV
Other fixed and 
working
Rare PO-III Classical 
industrial 
capitalist
PO-III or Putting-out variation III- The producer works on other’s premises or with 
rented equipment and working capital but in a self-directed labor-process and 
hands product over to merchant capitalist. Weavers in rural areas (sometimes 
called “dependent weavers”) often labor under such relations.
PO- IV or Putting-out variation IV- Producer works in own premises with own 
equipment but borrowed working capital but produces only a small part of a 
marketable product according to a capital-imposed division of labor. For example in 
the Lucknow chikan industry, the women who perform embroidery do so in their 
own homes with their own equipment with raw material being provided by a 
merchant capitalist’s agent. The producers (embroiders) do not have a product of 
their own to sell.
However the matrix above is missing a crucial aspect of the informal manufacturing 
sector which is important for understanding exploitation in the sector. This element 
is control over the product and factor markets, i.e. access to credit and raw 
materials and access to markets for finished goods, which is a function of market 
power and the structure of markets in general. This axis is particularly useful in 
revealing exploitation via unequal exchange which is potentially hidden in the 
typology above. A self-employed artisan with control over the process and product 
of labor may nevertheless lose independence via the loss of control over a market. 
This situation is depicted in Table 6.
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Table 6: Petty-proprietorships and market access
Labor
Market
Self product and 
process
Self access Independent 
producer
Other access Dependent 
producer 
Dependent producer - Producer works on own premises with own equipment and 
own working capital, not on order from any merchant, yet must eventually sell to 
one or a few merchant capitalist usually in an unequal exchange relationship. This 
highlights the fact that apparently self-employed workers can be at the mercy of 
various merchants and middlemen who make themselves vital to the survival of the 
producers either by extending trade credit or by retaining control over the market. 
In the next section we offer an example of this phenomenon from the Agra footwear 
industry.
Relating our typology to Roy’s (1993) typology, we can say that the “classical 
artisan” corresponds to Roy’s “independent weavers” (sale of product not tied to 
one buyer, no monopsony) and the putting-out variations correspond to the two 
types of “dependent weavers,” those employed on piece contracts (“seller of cloth”, 
PO- I and II) versus those on wage-employment (“seller of labor”, PO- III), the 
capitalist in the first instances being a merchant or money-lender and the second 
case being a larger producer-cum-merchant. An example of PO- III has been 
reported in Mau, UP, where large producers lease out looms to weavers. “Workers 
work in their own house but on someone else’s looms.” (Roy, 1993, p. 207)
These categories are also fluid and changing. For example in the Bhavani handloom 
industry in Tamil Nadu described by de Neve (2005) many capitalist owners of 
workshops who previously employed weavers on piece-wages began to sell or lease 
their looms to master-weavers to whom they provided yarn. The problems of 
managing the looms and disciplining labor were thus transferred from the merchant 
capitalist to the master-artisan. Further, the master-weavers are not owners of the 
product since they have been sub-contracted by merchants to whom they must 
return the finished product.
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Lastly, it should be noted that the fluidity of production relations is also manifested 
at the level of the individual worker who may work on piece-wages today, be a 
small contractor of laborers tomorrow and work on a factory shop-floor on the third 
day.
J. MODES OF SURPLUS EXTRACTION
As elaborated in the introduction, a “mode of surplus extraction” refers to the 
specific way in which unpaid labor is extracted from the producers and appropriated 
by the dominant classes. In advanced capitalist economies such as the United 
States, the employer-employee relationship (the wage-labor/capital relation) forms 
the single most important mode of surplus extraction although in the neoliberal 
period unequal exchange between larger and smaller capitalists via sub-contracting 
has assumed renewed importance. In contrast, developing economies such as India 
are characterized by a much greater variety of modes. Broadly speaking we may 
distinguish between three principal modes: wage-labor, unpaid work, and unequal 
exchange. In the first case surplus is pumped out of direct producers by ensuring 
that workers produce greater value than is returned to them in the form of wages. 
In the second case, one vital to both peasant production and artisanal production, 
the labor of women and children is extracted in return for direct subsistence. In the 
third case, the surplus produced in small-scale production, even if it be first 
appropriated by the direct producer, is eventually transferred from the producer to 
the merchant capitalist or from a small producer to a large producer (in the case of 
sub-contracting). 
Below we consider some specific institutional ways in which surplus extraction is 
achieved in the informal economy.
I. Piece wages
The NSSO does not gather data on whether wages paid in the informal sector are 
piece-wages or time-wages but we know from several case-studies that piece-
wages are still widely prevalent in small-scale manufacturing. In the Gujarat 
ceramic study cited earlier (Das 2003) 88% of informal units and 47.5% of formal 
units followed the piece-rate system. In a 1991 survey of 365 handicraft artisan 
units, 96% paid piece-wages (Vijayagopalan 1993). Marx (1992) notes the salient 
features of piece-wages:
The quality of the labor is here controlled by the work itself, which must be of 
average perfection if the piece-price is to be paid in full. Piece-wages 
become, from this point of view, the most fruitful source of reductions of 
wages and capitalistic cheating…They furnish to the capitalist an exact 
measure for the intensity of labor (p. 694).
Further,
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Given piece-wage, it is naturally the personal interest of the laborer to strain 
his labor-power as intensely as possible; this enables the capitalist to raise 
more easily the normal degree of intensity of labor. It is moreover now the 
personal interest of the laborer to lengthen the working-day, since with it his 
daily or weekly wages rise (p. 695).
Thus piece wages achieve an increased rate of exploitation via increasing intensity 
of labor and a lengthened working day while at the same time they obviate the 
need for control by the capitalist over the labor process. 
Since the quality and intensity of the work are here controlled by the form of 
wage itself, superintendence of labor becomes in great part superfluous. (p. 
695)
Hence Marx’s conclusion “that piece-wage is the form of wages most in harmony 
with the capitalist mode of production.” (pp. 697-98)
The two types of putting-out relations described by Marx, which give rise to a 
“hierarchically organized system of exploitation and oppression,” are still applicable 
to informal manufacturing in India:
On the one hand, piece-wages facilitate the interposition of parasites 
between the capitalist and the wage-laborer, the “sub-letting of labor.” The 
gain of these middlemen comes entirely from the difference between the 
labor-price which the capitalist pays, and the part of that price which they 
actually allow to reach the laborer. (p. 695)
We will shortly see examples of such exploitation via unequal exchange. And,
On the other hand, piece-wage allows the capitalist to make a contract for so 
much per piece with the head laborer-in manufactures with the chief of some 
group, in mines with the extractor of the coal, in the factory with the actual 
machine-worker — at a price for which the head laborer himself undertakes 
the enlisting and payment of his assistant work people. The exploitation of 
the laborer by capital is here effected through the exploitation of the laborer 
by the laborer (p. 695, emphasis added)
Both the systems noted above are found in the Agra footwear industry. For 
example, master artisans take responsibility for an order, execute part of the work 
themselves and recruit additional artisans as needed to fulfill the order, and 
merchants directly put-out orders to artisans who work on their own-account, with 
unpaid family labor to the deliver the product (Knorringa 1999). In general 
“exploitation of the laborer by the laborer” exactly characterizes production 
relations in the informal economy.
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II. Unequal exchange
The issue of unequal exchange and the "exploitation" of petty-producers and small 
capitalists by merchant capital is ubiquitous in the literature on artisans (see Portes 
and Walton 1981, Roy 1993, Knorringa 1999, Wilkinson-Weber 1999,). Yet few 
quantitative studies exist on the aggregate amount of surplus that is siphoned off in 
this fashion. Asymmetric market power needed for unequal exchange exists 
because typically many artisans must compete for the business of one or a few 
traders. An early 1990s survey of around 1500 self-employed handicraft producers 
found that around 50% of the artisans obtained their raw materials from traders 
(who placed the order) and around 90% handed over the finished product to 
middlemen/traders (Vijayagopalan 1993). Knorringa (1999) provides institutional 
detail in his study of the Agra shoe industry: 
Because plenty of anonymous artisans must bargain with a limited number of 
identifiable traders and because the small quantities allow for easy, quick, 
and accurate inspection, the margins for artisans are pushed down…
Moreover with all their working capital tied up in one production cycle, 
artisans in a direct sales channel cannot postpone selling. (p. 314)
Traders, on the other hand, can wait for artisan profit margins to decline. Further, 
traders also double as financiers extending credit in the form of leather raw 
material. Since these artisans are owners of their home-based production units and 
working capital this is a typical example of hidden dependency of self-employed 
artisans.
As mentioned earlier, depending on how prevalent such situations are, they cast 
doubt on aggregate value-added numbers. Since value-added is calculated simply 
by subtracting raw material costs from total receipts unequal exchange, by 
increasing input prices and decreasing output prices and thereby squeezing 
margins, will result in low value-added estimates. 
Apart from monopsonistic or monopolistic situations, extensive middlemen 
networks also serve to reduce the price paid to the artisan per piece. In Mexico’s 
garment industry, domestic women workers work on piece wages using their own 
sewing machines.
A blouse which retails for 120 pesos costs the merchant 60 pesos, plus the 
cost of the material which he has given ready-cut to the broker. The broker 
pays the seamstress 15-20 pesos and keeps the rest for himself. (Lomnitz, 
quoted in Portes and Walton, 1981, p. 99)
To accomplish the production target the seamstress may require the help of her 
children, mother, neighbors etc. This work is unpaid. Here we witness a common 
way of increasing absolute surplus value, by engaging not only the artisan but 
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his/her entire family for one person’s wage. Further, workers assume the costs of 
errors in production.
In the Lucknow Chikan industry middlemen (beechwaale), also called agents, 
perform the work of bringing cloth and other raw materials to the embroider at her 
home and then carrying off the finished product. Social norms around gender make 
producers accessible only to men who are the women’s relatives and neighbors.
Agents locate, recruit, and control labor that is otherwise inaccessible to the 
holder of capital. The agent is often a relative, or at least a neighbor of the 
women he employs, family members usually having preference in the 
allocation of work. For the rest, while agents do not control embroiderers by 
directly overseeing their work, they do impose a rudimentary discipline upon 
them by adjusting the flow of work according to the relative productivity of 
each woman, and adjusting wages as a means of penalizing deficient workers 
and rewarding good ones. In this way, agents effectively release the 
mahajans from the need to intervene directly in the labor process (Wilkinson-
Weber 1997, p. 59).
Agents are paid by the traders/merchants per piece and in turn pay the producer.
In Lucknow in 1990, prices started at around ten rupees for a small child's 
kurta (shirt), rising to 60 rupees for a man's kurta, simply embroidered.' 
Women's salwar-kamiz (tunic-pants ensembles) ranged in price from 40 to 
more than 100 rupees. Finely embroidered items, as well as large pieces like 
saris and tablecloths, cost several hundred rupees. Piece wages for 
embroidery on these items were as low as a single rupee for kurta 
embroidery in the village, five to fifteen rupees for salwar-kamiz embroidery 
in town, and up to 100 rupees for top-ticket items. In very rare 
circumstances, a highly skilled embroiderer might collect more than 100 
rupees for a specially commissioned piece obtained directly from the trader. 
At the other extreme, most women get their work through agents, who take a 
substantial cut from the piece wage, so that the women get no more than a 
fraction of a rupee for embroidering the most commonly sold item, a kurta. 
As might be expected, few embroiderers can afford to buy the products they 
make. (ibid, p. 52)
While male agents admit to taking at least 50 percent and sometimes more of the 
piece wage for themselves, female agents take less. (p. 60)
While one could make the case that given the technical conditions of production, 
the middlemen perform an essential function bringing together the components of 
the final commodity, it should be noted that their compensation can be far in excess 
of the labor they expend. Middlemen wages may thus be seen as cut of the surplus 
rather than wages per se, being proportional not to the labor expended but the 
scale of operation. This is analogous to Adam Smith’s observation that profit of 
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enterprise should not be viewed as wages for supervision since profits are 
proportional not to labor expended by the capitalist but rather to the stock of capital 
employed.
A last point to note is that exchange relations manifested in these terms of trade 
act in concert with production relations. Production relations (including but not 
limited to asset ownership patterns) determine market power. Market power and 
resulting terms of trade determine current income. Income determines future assets 
and production relations. It is important to emphasize this dual nature because 
arguments that limit themselves to deteriorating terms of trade or non-competitive 
market structures often do not question why the conditions of exchange are what 
they are. Why are rates of return on capital reaching 30 or 40% demanded from 
small producers? Perhaps because production is fragmented and volumes of loans 
are small, or purchase volumes are small, and transactions costs are large. 
Relations of production thus underlie relations of exchange. It is not only because 
intermediaries manipulate and monopolize that we get unequal exchange, but 
rather production relations can create the conditions for unequal exchange, which 
are exploited by intermediaries. This is not news. In fact such an argument forms 
the classical rationale for the formation of producer and peasant cooperatives.
III. Labor Bondage
Das (2003) in Gujarat Ceramics and De Neve (2005) in Tamil Nadu handlooms and 
powerlooms describe the practice of “consumption advances” which are used to 
hold workers in bondage. These advances (called “baki” in TN) can amount to as 
much as one year’s worth of wages for the worker and binds him to the employer 
until the loan is paid off, which may never happen.
Consumption advances were viewed in the modes of production debate as a type of 
feudal or semi-feudal arrangement which makes labor unfree. However the situation 
here is more complex. It is true that these advances often function as a device to 
retain skilled labor that reduces costs of replacement and training. However the 
resulting “rigidity” in the size of the labor force is also cited by employers as a 
problem during lean times or in dealing with “problem” workers. Further, workers 
retain mobility by transferring loans to new employers.
IV. Gender and Caste
Exploitation of unpaid domestic labor especially of women and children is ubiquitous 
in household enterprises. In addition to unpaid market work (to be distinguished 
from non-market work performed by women), women’s paid work is often devalued 
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as well. The Lucknow Chikan industry provides an archetypal example of surplus 
extraction achieved via devaluing of women’s paid work.
Women's embroidery, made in the home, is looked upon with far less respect 
than the products of men, made in their workshops. Chikan embroidery is 
thus not regarded seriously as an occupation in spite of the fact that many 
families depend upon the income they derive from it. In fact, it is customarily 
referred to by mahajans as "free-time" work to fill in the hours between 
cooking, cleaning, and caring for children. As an extension of women's unpaid 
household tasks, chikan is barely real work at all. Indeed, some mahajans 
regard themselves as doing women a favor by paying them to do leisure 
activities. As one put it, "They just sit around and they get work, and they get 
money. All in their spare time! I'm the one with all the headaches." 
(Wilkinson-Weber, 1997, p. 62)
Another avenue for the devaluing of productive work is via caste. Agra’s footwear 
industry offers a typical example of a caste-based division between artisans who 
produce a commodity and traders/merchants who sell it. Producers are chamars (an 
untouchable caste) while merchants are upper-caste Hindus from Punjab. In general 
the “producer castes” (artisans and peasants) are often shudras (OBCs) or dalits 
(SCs) while the traders and other non-productive workers belong to the forward 
castes. However, even in instances where employers and workers belong to the 
same caste, this may strengthen rather than undermine the regime of exploitation. 
For example Engelshoven (1999) alludes to the Surat diamond cutting industry 
where both employers and employees are Saurashtra Patels. While the caste 
monopoly helps workers retain some job security, it also make it difficult for them to 
challenge exploitation since community bonds are supposed to trump class 
contradictions. As a result there has been no strike in this industry.
Thus Gender and Caste hierarchies can serve to enhance surplus extraction 
occurring via wage-labor or unequal exchange. This highlights the importance of 
understanding how exploitation is produced at the intersection of several 
hierarchies. The intention is not to reduce Gender or Caste oppression to class 
exploitation, but rather to elucidate how each of these may reinforce (and at times 
undermine) the other.
K. SUMMARY AND AGGREGATE TRENDS
In the second part of this study we have attempted to take a broad look at the 
organization of informal industry in India. In particular we have focused on the 
evolution of firm size, the types of production relations and the modes of surplus 
extraction prevailing in informal industry. The following points should be 
emphasized:
63
1. The industrial sector as a whole (formal and informal) has not expanded greatly 
in terms of employment in the past three decades and today stands at around 18% 
(compared to China’s 24%) of total employment in the Indian economy.
2. The informal sector still accounts for around 75% of industrial employment in 
India. The employment share of the formal sector in general and large-scale 
industry in particular has been stagnant for the past three decades.
3. The number of informal firms and workers has been more of less stationary since 
the 1980s and the relative shares of petty-proprietorships, marginal and small 
capitalist firms is also largely unaltered.
4. Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal account for 30% of informal manufacturing 
enterprises as well as informal workers.
5. Food products, textiles and garments are the top three informal employers 
accounting for nearly 50% of employment. 
6. Most informal firms do not own substantial amounts of capital equipment. The 
land or building on which the firm is situated accounts for 60-80% of asset value for 
informal firms. In 2005-2006, across all three types of informal firms, 30% of total 
assets were hired. While hired assets formed a greater part of total assets for 
marginal and small capitalist firms, even for petty-proprietorships, nearly 25% of 
total assets were hired.
7. Even though GVA for the formal sector far outstrips GVA in the informal sector, 
value added in informal industry has increased significantly in the last decade. 
Since the number of workers has remained more or less the same, this suggests 
that labor productivity has been rising in this sector.
8. GVA calculations do not usually take into account the effect of unequal exchange 
and global value chains. High input prices and low output prices (unfavorable terms 
of trade) faced by small producers accentuate the problem of low value added in 
manufacturing.
9. Credit is important for all informal producers but petty-proprietors are the worst 
hit by money-lenders. The percentage of loans from money-lenders to rural petty-
proprietors has actually increased substantially in the period from 1994-95 to 2005-
06, while it has decreased for every other category during the same period.
10. The relations of production in informal industry are neither purely independent 
producer (characterized by producer’s control over the labor process and ownership 
of capital) nor only industrial capitalist (characterized by a proletarian workforce 
and a real subsumption of labor to capital). Rather a spectrum of putting-out 
relations based on formal subsumption of labor and a reliance on extraction of 
absolute rather than relative surplus value is observed.
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11. In addition to putting-out arrangements, nominally self-employed or 
independent producers are often locked into a relation of dependency vis-à-vis 
merchant and finance capital. This situation is closely analogous to the position of 
the peasant in the countryside with respect to intermediaries.
12. Piece-wages, unequal exchange, bonded labor, contingent and casual labor, and 
gender and caste oppression all conspire to increase the producer’s exploitation 
largely via extraction of absolute surplus value.
13. It is widely recognized that in the face of the failure of modern industry to 
expand satisfactorily, informal industry has acted as the “employer of last resort” 
for surplus labor in the agricultural sector. However NSS data also shows that 
employment in informal manufacturing has been more of less constant since the 
1980s. Thus it can be inferred that informal retail as well as informal labor in 
construction have largely absorbed the increase in the labor force.
14. Relations of dependency and lack of resources as well as incentives for technical 
change keep informal workers trapped in low productivity, low wage work. Surplus 
labor, low wages and intense (self) exploitation in turn create disincentives for 
technical change.
15. From the point of view of the large or formal-sector capitalist (whether merchant 
or industrial) sub-contracting arrangements retain advantages of economies of 
scale in purchase of means of production while circumventing the costs associated 
with a formal labor force. Number of workers protected by legislation is kept to a 
necessary minimum while much labor-intensive (skilled and unskilled) work is 
contracted out to informal units. Through employment of unpaid family labor and 
labor paid below official minimum wage, informal firms are able to survive and 
formal firms are able to extract larger amounts of surplus value. The disintegration 
of the textile mills and their conversion into powerloom sweat-shops is an example 
of this process.
16. Labor bondage, gender and caste hierarchies, unpaid domestic work and 
contingent and casual labour can all be understood as attempts to increase 
absolute surplus value. This reinforces the fact that in all these cases, there is 
formal rather than real subsumption of labor by capital. The incentive to alter the 
methods of production or adopt new techniques of production comes, in these 
circumstances, from the direct producer, who however, lacks the resources to 
undertake this task. Capitalists in the formal sector do not have the incentive to 
undertake technical change because under formal subsumption of labor there is no 
drive to increase relative surplus value. Efforts to increase productivity and reduce 
work burdens are thus doubly undermined as producers, who have the incentive do 
not control their own surplus while capitalists, given a large labor force ready to 
work for extremely low wages, have resources but do not face incentives for 
technical change. Naturally, we do not mean to imply that the above-stated reason 
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is the only factor in continued low labor productivities observed in informal 
manufacturing, but it is nevertheless an important part of the story.
PART III: CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, we would like to raise some political and philosophical issues 
and questions for further discussion without in any way claiming to have arrived at 
any conclusive answers. Though both the authors largely agree as to the aggregate 
trends presented above, we derive different political and social implications from 
these trends. This derives partly from different political and philosophical 
perspectives that both of us see ourselves closest to. Rather than paper over our 
differences, we therefore, present our alternative viewpoints, which might even be 
contradictory, for further debate and discussion.
The first issue that we wish to put forward for discussion relates to the dynamics of 
class differentiation. As we have seen, both in agriculture and in industry, the 
persistence of petty production is a characteristic feature of Indian capitalism; what 
does this imply? It implies that almost all members of the working class occupy, at 
different points in time, multiple positions in the structure of production, i.e., within 
a short time span, each member of the working population participates in multiple 
production relations and her consciousness is shaped by these multiple, and often 
drastically, different objective positions in the production process . Even a casual 
glance at rural India demonstrates this multiplicity. At one time a worker is an 
agricultural labourer, exploited through the institution of wage-labour; at another 
time, often within weeks or months, she is a tenant cultivator, hiring in land from 
the local landlord and facing exploitation through semi-feudal methods; at another 
point she is a petty producer, operating as a owner-operator of a small business and 
using family labour for production purposes. 
This multiplicity of objective positions in the production process has very important 
implications for the process of class differentiation and development of 
revolutionary class consciousness: class differentiation that was observed in Europe 
(and in particular in England), during its capitalist transformation, differentiation of 
society between a relatively homogeneous proletariat (who only sell their labour-
power) and a capitalist class (who only appropriate surplus value through the 
institution of wage-labour), is not what we observe today in India (and other 
similarly placed ex-colonies). Thus, the capitalism that is developing in India is 
drastically different from the one that developed in Europe between the latter half 
of 16th and 18th centuries. In the Indian case, the persistence of petty production in 
agriculture, industry as well as services has been interpreted as arrested class 
differentiation. However a closer look at the evolving relations of production reveals 
that class differentiation is proceeding, albeit in a way different from the European 
case. For example the differentiation that is taking place in rural India is more 
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between a heterogeneous rural gentry and a heterogeneous rural poor, than 
between capitalist and worker. In industry too, the apparent preponderance of petty 
production hides the extent of wage-labor, for example by making a piece-rate 
wage worker appear as an own-account producer. Both in agriculture and in 
industry the actual extent of alienated labor is hidden by a semblance of private 
property.
If the class differentiation at the lower end of the social and economic hierarchy is 
masked by participation of members of the working population in multiple relations 
of production, the rural gentry at the other end of the spectrum is also a complex 
entity. How did this rural gentry come into being? Land reforms, of a decidedly timid 
variety, “sliced off a bit of the old land-owning classes, those that owned enormous 
estates, and incorporated a small upper section of the tenants in the land-owning 
group, thus creating a broader strata of landowners…” (Desai, 1986: quoted in 
Balagopal, 1986). Members of the rural gentry have, over the years, lost some of 
the monopoly over land, as we have seen, but facing this decline, have nicely 
“diversified” their portfolios into other areas of rural economic life, thereby 
maintaining their hold over rural society (Metcalf, 1967). Facilitated by a pliable 
state, members of this class gradually got involved in trade and usury, in 
government contracts for infrastructure works, in building and maintaining hotels, 
cinema theatres, petrol pumps, etc. They continue to rely heavily on their 
relationship to the State to facilitate the reproduction of their capital; and without 
exception, they are the local notables of mainstream political parties, often 
maintaining their own militias to politically intimidate the local population.
It is difficult to differentiate, within the rural gentry, between feudal interests and 
capitalist interests, as much as it is difficult to differentiate between different 
varieties of capital: industrial, merchant, usurious. Analogously, from the point of 
view of the working class, it is difficult to identify where surplus extraction via 
unequal exchange stops and that via wage-labor begins. As feudal methods of 
surplus extraction, like tenancy, declined and as their hold on the monopoly of land 
dwindled, members of the rural gentry painlessly morphed into capitalist farmers 
and local merchants. Some started industrial activities with the support of the State, 
while others ploughed their capital into money-lending. It is worth noting that never 
in independent India have the class of capitalist farmers taken up arms against the 
so-called feudal interests in land; the contradiction, to the extent it ever existed 
between these fractions of the rural ruling classes, have been resolved in the most 
amicable manner.
The second issue worth considering is the continued centrality of the agrarian 
question to any project for revolutionizing Indian society. This follows simply from 
the fact that the majority of the working people in India are related, directly or 
indirectly, with the agricultural sector; this is a direct result of the failure of the 
structural transformation of the Indian economy. Any attempt, therefore, at radical 
reconstruction of Indian society will have to deal with the agrarian question 
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effectively. Dealing with the agrarian question will mean, among other things, 
rapidly increasing the productivity of agricultural activity, the surest way to increase 
the income of the vast masses of the working people involved in agriculture and 
thereby create a home market for domestic industry.
The Marxist tradition has seen redistributive land reforms as essential to the project 
of dealing with the agrarian question. The reasons have primarily been political, 
though some economic arguments have also been developed.13 Politically, land 
reforms have been seen as a way to decisively break the power of the parasitic 
class of feudal and semi-feudal landlords; economically, it has been understood as 
creating conditions for the development of the productive forces in rural society, 
increasing the productivity of labour, creating a surplus for supporting 
industrialization and providing a market for domestic industry.
Using Lenin’s distinction between the Prussian and the American paths for 
bourgeois development in the rural economy lends credence to the call for 
redistributive land reforms. Discussing the “two forms” of bourgeois development 
out of the feudal and semi-feudal order characterized by serfdom in late 19th 
century Russia, he says:  
The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the 
transformation of landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the 
landlord latifundia, i. e., either by reform or by revolution. Bourgeois 
development may proceed by having big landlord economies at the head, 
which will gradually become more and more bourgeois and gradually 
substitute bourgeois for feudal methods of exploitation. It may also proceed 
by having small peasant economies at the head, which in a revolutionary 
way, will remove the “excrescence” of the feudal latifundia from the social 
organism and then freely develop without them along the path of capitalist 
economy. 
Those two paths of objectively possible bourgeois development we would call 
the Prussian path and the American path, respectively. In the first case feudal 
landlord economy slowly evolves into bourgeois, Junker landlord economy, 
which condemns the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation 
and bondage, while at the same time a small minority of Grossbauern (“big 
peasants”) arises. In the second case there is no landlord economy, or else it 
is broken up by revolution, which confiscates and splits up the feudal estates. 
In that case the peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of 
agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer. In the first case the main 
content of the evolution is transformation of feudal bondage into servitude 
13 Patnaik (1972) summarily rejects any economic rationale for land reforms and instead 
stresses the political logic; but Patnaik (1976) and Patnaik (1986) develop an explicitly eco-
nomic logic for land reforms in terms of overcoming the ground rent barrier to capitalist de-
velopment. 
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and capitalist exploitation on the land of the feudal landlords—Junkers. In the 
second case the main background is transformation of the patriarchal 
peasant into a bourgeois farmer.  (Lenin, 1907).
The three main communist streams in India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation and the Communist Party 
of India (Maoist) more or less accept this distinction, the first two explicitly and the 
last one implicitly.14 Hence, for all the three streams the main task (or axis) of the 
current stage of the Peoples (or New) Democratic Revolution is the agrarian 
revolution, with redistributive land reforms being one of its main tasks. 
While it is true that India, because it did not witness any serious efforts at land 
reforms on a national scale, developed along the landlord path out of semi-
feudalism, there are some important differences that need to be considered. One 
pole of landlord capitalism, viz., landlessness has been growing over the years; the 
other pole of landlord capitalism, viz., the continued dominance of a few “big 
peasants” seems to be at variance with the evidence. Aggregate level data about 
India that we have seen in the course of this study seems to throw up an 
unmistakable trend of the declining power of landlords (feudal or otherwise), not by 
any revolutionary means but just by the sheer pressure of demographic 
developments and economic stagnation. The total land owned by the large 
landholding families, the “big peasants” that Lenin refers to, have halved over the 
last five decades and today they own only about 12 percent of the total land. On the 
other hand, the land owned by medium-to-small landholding families has increased 
to over 65 percent. Does this, along with other evidence on the decline of tenancy 
and the increase of wage-labour, not indicate that the rural economy in India is 
inexorably being pushed in the direction of peasant capitalism? How would this 
important trend of the increasing dominance of peasant capitalism, and a gradual 
whittling down of landlord capitalism, change the course of the agrarian revolution? 
If landlords, as a class, are dwindling in economic and social power, is a programme 
aimed at breaking their political power still relevant? Is the contradiction between 
feudalism and the broad masses of the people still the principal contradiction in 
India today?
Another issue that will need to be addressed in the context of the slogan for 
redistributive land reforms is to see whether the resulting farms will be viable in any 
meaningful economic sense. Let us recall that the average size of ownership holding 
in India in 2003 was 0.81 hectares; so, the most equitable redistribution will result 
14 CPI(M) and CPI(ML) Liberation explicitly recognize the current rural scenario in India as be-
ing characterized by landlord capitalism; this was most clearly formulated by Patnaik (1976, 
1986) and finds its place in the CPI(M) programme accordingly; it also appears explicitly in 
the agrarian programme of CPI(ML) Liberation, though there is no mention of Patnaik (1976, 
1986). The CPI (Maoist), on the other hand, largely discounts the development of capitalist 
relations in rural Indian. Characterization of Indian society can be found in the programmes 
of the CPI(M), CPI(ML) Liberation and CPI(Maoist); links for the programmes are provided in 
the references. 
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in the average holding of this size. If instead land is only taken from those owning 
more than 10 acres and all of it distributed among those currently owning less than 
1 acre, then the average size of holding for those receiving redistributed land will 
roughly become 1.25 acres.
If we juxtapose this with the cost of cultivation data, we can easily see that 
agricultural units of approximately such sizes will not be economically viable in the 
sense of being able to generate any substantial surplus product after sustaining a 
decent level of consumption of the producers. It is extremely doubtful whether 
these small farms can generate any economic surplus even after the onerous 
relations of unequal exchange have been removed from the picture. Can they, 
therefore, help in the industrialization effort by generating surplus or will they 
instead require a net resource flow in their direction with subsidized credit, power, 
inputs, technology, etc. to continuously keep them viable? This question is 
extremely important as can be seen from the concrete experiences of the Russian 
and Chinese revolutions.
The growth of capitalist relations in the Indian countryside, the continued 
fragmentation of the land, the decline in tenancy, the unviability of small-scale 
production and other related factors seem to suggest that collective forms of 
agricultural production are gradually being pushed on to the historical agenda of 
the revolutionary movements in India. Collective, cooperative and socialist forms of 
large-scale agriculture probably need to be seriously considered as an option 
emerging out of the very evolution of the material conditions of the vast masses of 
the working people. The agenda of redistributive land reforms creating bourgeois 
property in rural areas and facilitating capitalist development needs to be seriously 
rethought, not because of some ideological reasons but because the development 
of the agrarian structure seems to demand such a re-evaluation.
It is not that redistributive land reform is, either economically or politically, not 
useful; it is extremely useful at this stage of Indian development and thus finds 
pride of place in the programme of all the communist streams.  Land reforms will 
certainly help in increasing the consumption levels of the vast masses of the 
peasantry from their current abysmally low levels; it will democratize the ownership 
structure in rural society; it will help create an internal market for the accumulation 
of capital; it will help break the stranglehold of the rural gentry over rural social and 
political life. All these reasons undoubtedly make redistributive land reforms an 
indispensable part of any strategy for the radical restructuring of Indian society.
Without in any way undermining the logic of land reforms in the present Indian 
context we would also like to strike a cautionary note, following Paul Baran (1957), 
against treating land reforms as a panacea for all economic problems of an 
underdeveloped society such as India. The agrarian structure of rural India, with its 
extremely low land-man ratio, suggests that the limits of the positive aspects of 
redistributive land reforms will be reached pretty quickly; it will need to be 
70
positively transcended within a very short time. Hence, the transition from a focus 
on redistributive land reforms and support for peasant capitalism to an emphasis on 
collective ownership and production will need to be reckoned with from the very 
beginning; both the agrarian structure and historical lessons suggest such an 
emphasis.
The third large issue raised by our study concerns the mode of industrialization of 
the Indian economy. It is relatively uncontroversial that a shift of the agricultural 
population into the secondary and tertiary sectors will be required in order to raise 
real incomes of the vast majority. How this transformation is to be achieved is the 
question. The structural transformation required to relieve above-mentioned 
pressures on agriculture cannot be left to the anarchy of the global capitalist 
market. The “market-friendly” post-1991 period has been witness to a type of 
growth that has resulted in rising inequality and increasing number of low-wage, 
contingent and informal jobs. However the contradictions and problems of the pre-
Reform, “planning period” also need to be taken seriously. There is an urgent need 
to break out of certain simple binaries and equations which have been imposed 
upon us. The first binary is that between State-managed capitalism and market-
oriented capitalism. India’s experience shows that the vast majority of the working 
population has suffered greatly in both regimes. In our struggle against a 
particularly predatory type of neoliberal capitalism (whose days may in any case be 
numbered given the global crisis), we must not find ourselves unwittingly arguing 
for a return to the bureaucratic and corrupt State. Rather the spectacular failure of 
the neoliberal model can be an opportunity to demand greater decentralization and 
more autonomous development. The various people’s movements have been 
articulating precisely such a model of development.
The second simple equation is between rural areas and agriculture on the one hand, 
and cities and industry on the other hand. The social and ecological contradictions 
of the large-scale, capital intensive model of industrialization must be taken 
seriously. Nowhere has this model produced high levels of employment in an 
ecologically sustainable fashion while giving producers a say in the running of the 
workplace. It is becoming increasingly clear that the economic viability of such 
industrialization is obtained only by cost externalization. The Indian experience 
points to the necessity for developing dispersed, low capital-intensity, sustainable 
models of industry that nevertheless raise real incomes of the majority (see Datye 
1997 for one such model). This is not a utopian pipe-dream but rather a historical 
necessity if “development” is not to remain an unfulfilled promise for the majority of 
Indians.
None of the above can be taken only as a demand for better or more enlightened 
development policy. Rather it articulates what has already been emerging from 
social and political movements and in turn seeks to ground the political demands in 
an empirical and theoretical context. There is a need to extend revolutionary 
people’s movements rooted in peasant agriculture and national resource struggles 
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into the rural, semi-urban and urban industrial milieu. The urgent question here is 
how can the dispersed industrial working class be effectively politically organized at 
a national level? This working class does not always resemble the “classical” 
doubly-free, urban industrial proletariat. Yet, our attempt here has shown that it 
remains exploited nonetheless and can and should form an important component of 
left revolutionary politics. Is an artisan-peasant alliance a possibility for the near 
future?
There is a difference of opinion between the two of us on the question of the model 
of industrialization that might fruitfully accompany efforts at a radical restructuring 
of Indian society. One of us (AB) believes, as has been stated in the above 
paragraphs, that a dispersed, low capital-intensity, sustainable model of 
industrialization is the way forward. While we agree that the scale and geographic 
dispersal of industrialization per se does not lead to its being more democratic or 
ecologically sustainable, DB places more importance on the institutional setting 
within which the industrialization effort is embedded. A small-scale industrialization 
effort in the context of local level inequalities of class, caste and gender can 
reinforce those inequalities and nullify all attempts at democratic control of the 
production process; on the other hand, a large-scale, high capital intensity and 
centralized industrialization effort within a socialist context might be amenable to 
democratic control if the institutions of workers’ control are in place. DB believes 
that the experience of the Russian and Chinese revolutions shows that petty 
production of the artisanal variety cannot solve either the economic problems of the 
vast masses of an underdeveloped country like India or the political problems of a 
society embarking on the socialist path. Sustainability, for DB seems to have more 
to do with proper cost-benefit analysis rather than the scale of production as such. 
In a socialist context, where the surplus product of society is democratically 
controlled, the pace and direction of technical change will be determined in a 
rational and scientific manner and not left to the anarchy of capitalist production 
and the imperatives of profit maximization. In such a setting, internalizing the 
environmental costs of production would flow naturally from the imperatives of all 
round social development. 
It has been our effort in the present study to arrive a macro understanding of Indian 
agriculture and Industry from the Marxist perspective. As our differing positions 
advanced above indicate, we do not intend to argue for any one right solution to the 
problems identified in the study. Rather we hope that the data and the 
accompanying reflections and speculations will serve to fuel further discussions and 
debate out of which visions for a future Indian society may emerge.
(We would like to thanks Debarshi Das, Gail Omvedt, Mohan Rao, Sukla Sen, Abhay 
Shukla and Rahul Varman for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.)
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Average Size of Ownership Holding in India
1961-62 1971-72 1982 1992 2003
Estimated Area Owned (million ha) 128.73 119.64 119.74 117.35 107.23
Average area owned (ha)
   Including landless 1.78 1.53 1.28 1.01 0.73
   Excluding landless 2.01 1.69 1.44 1.14 0.81
Area Operated (millon ha) 133.48 125.68 118.57 125.1 107.65
Average area operated (ha) 2.63 2.2 1.67 1.34 1.06
Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
Table A2: Land Ownership Structure in Rural India by Ownership Size-Class
marginal small semi-medium medium large
1961 % of households 66.06 9.16 12.86 9.07 2.85
% of area owned 7.59 12.39 20.54 31.23 28.25
1971 % of households 62.62 15.49 11.94 7.83 2.12
% of area owned 9.76 14.68 21.92 30.73 22.91
1982 % of households 66.64 14.70 10.78 6.45 1.42
% of area owned 12.22 16.49 23.58 29.83 18.07
1992 % of households 71.88 13.42 9.28 4.54 0.88
% of area owned 16.93 18.59 24.58 26.07 13.83
2003 % of households 79.60 10.80 6.00 3.00 0.60
 % of area owned 23.05 20.38 21.98 23.08 11.55
Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A3: Large Landholding States: Share of Area Owned by Owner-
ship Size-Class
mar-
ginal small
semi-
medium
mediu
m
Larg
e
ANDHRA 
PRADESH 2003 21.87 19.95 21.16 22.91 14.05
1992 21.30 22.44 24.15 24.06 8.06
1982 11.26 15.29 20.70 29.83 22.92
1971-72 9.92 13.16 21.19 30.15 25.58
GUJRAT 2003 13.60 16.05 18.96 39.12 12.28
1992 9.55 15.44 24.78 31.99 18.24
1982 6.66 10.78 22.63 39.45 20.49
1971-72 4.53 9.94 16.73 36.15 32.65
HARYANA 2003 13.15 15.83 24.62 34.14 12.26
1992 7.96 13.43 33.54 37.17 7.91
1982 5.04 13.44 21.58 44.90 15.05
1971-72 4.63 7.43 18.95 46.93 22.06
KARNATAKA 2003 16.65 19.45 23.18 29.52 11.20
1992 11.05 18.35 27.82 26.62 16.16
1982 6.21 13.56 25.40 31.45 23.38
1971-72 5.74 11.81 24.84 35.19 22.42
MADHYA 
PRADESH 2003 11.61 19.07 25.80 31.25 12.29
1992 7.61 15.49 24.97 35.38 16.57
1982 4.99 11.08 24.30 37.93 21.72
1971-72 3.34 9.16 21.36 37.80 28.34
MAHARASHTRA 2003 12.38 17.57 30.88 27.35 11.78
1992 7.02 12.61 25.54 33.43 21.41
1982 4.65 10.90 20.82 36.23 27.40
1971-72 3.48 8.59 18.34 35.45 34.14
PUNJAB 2003 9.16 15.63 25.30 34.50 15.31
1992 7.18 12.35 30.21 38.04 12.22
1982 5.59 10.76 22.87 42.23 18.56
1971-72 4.47 8.87 25.06 37.96 23.64
RAJASTHAN 2003 9.26 11.19 18.61 28.40 32.52
1992 5.42 10.04 18.90 31.55 34.10
1982 3.63 7.29 17.29 35.19 36.59
 1971-72 2.03 6.78 13.15 32.89 45.15
Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A4: Small Landholding States: Share of Area Owned by Ownership 
Size-Class
mar-
ginal small
semi-
medium medium large
ASSAM 2003 44.42 34.87 16.36 4.32 0.00
1992 38.05 29.07 23.06 8.53 1.29
1982 24.53 34.81 27.67 11.50 1.48
1971-72 22.15 30.22 30.79 15.20 1.64
BIHAR 2003 42.07 25.29 18.53 9.56 4.63
1992 28.58 23.84 24.45 18.68 4.44
1982 23.96 22.91 27.02 20.22 5.90
1971-72 18.20 23.43 28.07 23.63 6.67
HIMACHAL PRADESH 2003 43.80 28.02 19.77 6.45 2.03
1992 34.99 20.35 21.57 18.50 4.60
1982 20.94 23.09 26.04 27.82 2.11
1971-72 21.22 23.43 25.92 23.12 6.31
J&K 2003 36.26 25.49 19.54 11.12 7.58
1992 25.52 33.40 25.84 15.23 0.00
1982 28.13 30.29 28.70 12.56 0.32
1971-72 27.41 39.33 25.20 8.06 0.00
KERALA 2003 60.72 21.13 10.78 7.16 0.00
1992 54.51 24.19 14.32 6.33 0.66
1982 45.74 23.51 19.11 10.06 1.59
1971-72 40.88 24.32 19.95 11.89 2.96
ORISSA 2003 41.52 27.06 19.72 9.98 1.78
1992 26.37 27.16 25.99 18.08 2.40
1982 19.88 29.73 25.04 19.50 5.84
1971-72 20.45 26.95 25.88 20.72 6.00
TAMIL NADU 2003 33.21 23.10 22.09 20.57 1.23
1992 33.28 26.24 24.15 12.15 4.18
1982 23.57 27.24 23.53 20.94 4.71
1971-72 20.23 21.84 25.21 22.97 9.75
UTTAR PRADESH 2003 34.89 27.38 20.74 14.65 2.34
1992 27.42 24.88 25.82 18.14 3.73
1982 20.36 24.08 28.11 22.25 5.18
1971-72 17.49 24.65 27.94 23.85 6.07
WEST BENGAL 2003 58.23 25.71 11.88 4.02 0.00
1992 41.29 28.11 22.98 7.62 0.00
1982 30.33 28.77 27.23 12.12 1.54
 1971-72 27.28 25.69 27.72 18.61 0.70
Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A5: Effective Landlessness in Rural India: Cumulative Distribution of Land Owner-
ship Patterns over Time
1961-62 1971-72 1982 1992 2003
Area 
Owned
% of 
hhlds
% of 
area
% of 
hhlds
% of 
area
% of 
hhlds
% of 
area
% of 
hhlds
% of 
area
% of 
hhlds
% of 
area
   0 ha 11.68 0 9.64 0 11.33 0 11.25 0 10.04 0.01
< 0.21 ha 37.9 0.54 37.42 0.69 39.93 0.9 42.4 1.31 50.6 2.08
< 0.41 ha 44.21 1.59 44.87 2.07 48.21 2.75 51.36 3.8 60.15 5.83
    Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
Table A6: Cultivators and Agricultural Workers in Ru-
ral India, 2001
Cultiva-
tors
Ag Work-
ers
Agwrkr/C
ultiv
Andhra Pradesh 7757337 13384671 1.73
Arunachal Pradesh 275403 17634 0.06
Assam 3712769 1253451 0.34
Bihar 8075104 13145639 1.63
Goa 45885 31076 0.68
Gujarat 5697434 4983209 0.87
Haryana 2958215 1224403 0.41
Himachal Pradesh 1946890 92598 0.05
Jammu & Kashmir 1559633 227325 0.15
Jharkhand 3858788 2810671 0.73
Karnataka 6684521 5901934 0.88
Kerala 693986 1507081 2.17
Madhya Pradesh 10733516 7136391 0.66
Maharashtra 11569293 10314720 0.89
Orissa 4197912 4921925 1.17
Punjab 1998640 1394035 0.70
Rajasthan 12921374 2436566 0.19
Sikkim 131201 16952 0.13
Tamil Nadu 4773028 7533766 1.58
Tripura 310871 272712 0.88
Uttar Pradesh 21754799 12931317 0.59
Uttaranchal 1556202 244520 0.16
West Bengal 5585848 7240517 1.30
Total
1187986
49 99023113 0.83
                Source: Census of India, 2001.
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Table A7: Share of Tenant Holdings by Operational 
Size-Class
Percentage of tenant holdings
1960-
61
1970-
71
1981-
82
1991-
92
2002-
03
Marginal 24.1 27 14.4 9.3 9.8
Small 25.1 27.8 17.9 14.9 10.7
Semi-medium 23.6 24.8 15.9 12.2 10.3
Medium 20.5 20 14.5 13.1 7.8
Large 9.5 15.9 11.5 16.7 13.8
All sizes 23.5 25.7 15.2 11 9.9
              Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
Table A8: Tenancy in the Major Indian States
share of tenant hold-
ings share of area leased in
1981-
82
1991-
92
2002-
03
1981-
82
1991-
92
2002-
03
ANDHRA PRADESH 13.8 14.1 12.9 6.2 9.6 9.0
ASSAM 12.9 10.1 8.9 6.4 8.9 5.3
BIHAR 19.7 5.6 12.7 10.3 3.9 8.9
GUJARAT 4.8 3.7 5.3 2.0 3.3 5.1
HARYANA 25.9 17.1 10.7 18.2 33.7 14.4
KARNATAKA 10.7 8.0 4.6 6.0 7.4 3.6
KERALA 6.7 5.2 5.1 2.6 2.9 4.0
MADHYA PRADESH 8.0 9.0 7.3 3.6 6.3 3.6
MAHARASHTRA 10.6 6.9 6.6 5.2 5.5 4.7
ORISSA 18.2 16.9 19.4 9.9 9.5 13.0
PUNJAB 21.3 15.9 13.1 16.1 18.8 16.8
RAJASTHAN 7.1 6.5 2.9 4.3 5.2 2.8
TAMIL NADU 24.7 15.3 9.4 10.9 10.9 6.0
UTTAR PRADESH 20.5 15.5 11.7 10.2 10.5 9.5
WEST BENGAL 23.1 14.4 14.1 12.3 10.4 9.3
Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A9: Share of Leased-in Area by Terms of Lease
terms of lease
1960-
61
1970-
71
1981-
82 1991-92 2002-03
incl 
n.r.
excl 
n.r.
incl 
n.r.
excl 
n.r.
fixed money 25.6 15.4 10.9 19 22.7 29.5 29.8
fixed produce 12.9 11.6 6.3 14.5 17.4 20.3 20.6
share of produce 38.2 47.9 41.9 34.4 41.1 40.3 40.8
Other 23.3 25.1 40.9 32.1 18.8 9.9 8.8
Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003; n.r.=not 
reported.
Table A10: Share of Area by Terms of Lease, Major Indian 
States: 2002-03
fixed 
money
fixed 
pro-
duce
share 
of pro-
duce
from 
rela-
tives other
ANDHRA 
PRADESH 31.6 37.9 24.0 2.1 4.4
ASSAM 15.8 3.6 55.0 0.0 25.6
BIHAR 12.0 17.5 67.0 0.5 3.0
GUJARAT 10.7 46.3 37.9 3.5 1.6
HARYANA 71.2 9.8 15.8 0.1 3.1
KARNATAKA 32.4 41.1 24.8 0.0 1.7
KERALA 39.9 7.5 12.0 33.0 7.8
MADHYA 
PRADESH 18.3 32.5 39.0 1.6 8.6
MAHARASHTRA 26.2 9.0 37.5 15.7 11.6
ORISSA 11.1 7.8 73.0 3.5 4.6
PUNJAB 79.2 1.5 15.3 3.1 0.9
RAJASTHAN 35.0 17.7 39.3 1.1 6.9
TAMIL NADU 32.0 30.0 22.9 7.3 7.8
UTTAR PRADESH 23.8 12.9 52.9 5.0 5.4
WEST BENGAL 23.7 28.5 34.9 4.1 8.8
INDIA 29.5 20.3 40.3 4.0 5.9
               Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A11: Share of Debt from Various Sources for Cultivator 
Households (%)
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002
Sources of Credit
Institutional 7.3 18.7 31.7 63.2 66.3 61.1
   Cooperative Societies 3.3 2.6 22 29.8 30 30.2
   Commercial Banks 0.9 0.6 2.4 28.8 35.2 26.3
Non-Institutional 92.7 81.3 66.3 36.8 30.6 38.9
   Moneylenders 69.7 49.2 36.1 16.1 17.5 26.8
   Unspecified - - - - 3.1 - 
           Source: Government of India, 2007.
Table A12: Gross Capital Formation in Agriculture at 1993-94 
Prices
GFCFA CIS GCFA GFCFA CIS GCFA
1961 59.02 3.77 62.79 1981 137.21 5.12 142.33
1962 54.68 0.23 54.91 1982 134.07 6.72 140.79
1963 58.33 2.00 60.33 1983 137.66 7.63 145.29
1964 62.72 2.77 65.49 1984 139.26 7.99 147.25
1965 68.14 1.14 69.28 1985 138.46
11.0
2 149.48
1966 71.77 2.27 74.04 1986 130.61
10.7
1 141.32
1967 72.79 1.64 74.43 1987 127.89 9.19 137.08
1968 79.55 0.49 80.04 1988 133.75 9.19 142.94
1969 78.83 6.83 85.66 1989 143.35 4.27 147.62
1970 83.18 5.83 89.01 1990 127.28 6.96 134.24
1971 79.80 6.85 86.65 1991 158.05 6.11 164.16
1972 83.72 7.98 91.70 1992 145.46 4.19 149.65
1973 90.63 12.46 103.09 1993 156.10 5.31 161.41
1974 88.15 15.54 103.69 1994 147.49 5.00 152.49
1975 86.09 13.55 99.64 1995 160.12 8.31 168.43
1976 93.48 22.97 116.45 1996 170.14 8.70 178.84
1977 113.56 30.99 144.55 1997 174.72
12.9
1 187.63
1978 115.85 17.21 133.06 1998 174.99
11.8
1 186.80
1979 129.97 51.99 181.96 1999 179.79
10.3
3 190.12
1980 136.09 42.14 178.23     
         Source: Gulati and Bathla, 2002.
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Table A13: GDCF, GDP and Shares in 1993-94 prices
Years
GDCF 
(Rs bil-
lion)
GDP (Rs 
billion)
GFCA/G
DCF
GDPA/
GDP
GDCF/G
DP
1960-61 435.49 2221.61 14.42 40.53 19.6
1961-62 409.96 2305.72 13.39 39.61 17.78
1962-63 465.05 2375.2 12.97 37.61 19.58
1963-64 489.12 2519.79 13.39 38.52 19.41
1964-65 540.61 2707.27 12.82 40.36 19.97
1965-66 616.79 2638.64 12 38.14 23.38
1966-67 641.01 2634.41 11.61 39.21 24.33
1967-68 600.68 2839.76 13.32 41.92 21.15
1968-69 588.05 2938.17 14.58 40.79 20.01
1969-70 666.26 3130.39 13.36 40.51 21.28
1970-71 689.71 3292.27 12.56 39.09 20.95
1971-72 709.78 3348.42 12.92 37.28 21.2
1972-73 697.14 3329.12 14.79 37.19 20.94
1973-74 816.64 3434.73 12.7 40.3 23.78
1974-75 724.58 3475.53 13.75 37.39 20.85
1975-76 759.45 3794.04 15.33 34.48 20.02
1976-77 853.06 3858.69 16.94 32.69 22.11
1977-78 966 4137.81 13.77 34.18 23.35
1978-79 1112.5 4375.04 16.36 32.41 25.43
1979-80 981.59 4145.71 18.16 30.56 23.68
1980-81 981.91 4423.19 14.5 36.02 22.2
1981-82 991.98 4717.09 14.19 35.56 21.03
1982-83 991.99 4880.89 14.65 34.13 20.32
1983-84 1025.14 5216.87 14.36 34.98 19.65
1984-85 1112.26 5453.49 13.44 33.96 20.4
1985-86 1217.57 5766.54 11.61 32.35 21.11
1986-87 1219.78 6031.39 11.24 30.73 20.22
1987-88 1398.91 6265.59 10.22 29.19 22.33
1988-89 1584.54 6895.41 9.32 30.63 22.98
1989-90 1699.65 7325.78 7.9 29.25 23.2
1990-91 1956.5 7733.49 8.39 28.85 25.3
1991-92 1715.53 7815.75 8.72 28.1 21.95
1992-93 1874.77 8185.44 8.61 28.39 22.9
1993-94 1984.12 8592.2 7.69 28.16 23.09
1994-95 2421.13 9222.89 6.96 27.55 26.25
1995-96 2692.19 9928.77 6.64 25.37 27.12
1996-97 2638.83 10619.02 7.11 26 24.85
84
1997-98 2985.68 11103.84 6.25 24.39 26.89
1998-99 2975.18 11853.99 6.39 24.48 25.1
               Source:  Gulati and Bathla, 2002.
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